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BACK TO THE FUTURE: AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF CHILD CUSTODY OUTCOMES*
SUZANNE REYNOLDS, CATHERINE T. HARRIS, AND RALPH A.
PEEPLES**
As no-fault divorce replaced fault-based divorce in the late 1970's,
proponents of alternative dispute resolution convinced courts and
legislatures that mediation promised significant benefits for family
law, especially for disputes about child custody. In 1981, states
began to respond with statutes requiring the parties to mediate
before bringing their custody disputes to the courtroom. The move
for mandatory mediation of custody met a firestorm of protest,
especially from feminist scholars who warned that mandatory
mediation would lead to an increase in the incidence of joint
physical custody arrangements. Mediators, warned the critics,
would view joint physical custody as the easiest way to reach an
agreement between the parents. Fearing the consequences of failing
to cooperate, mothers would feel pressure to "agree" to the
arrangement, even if they disagreed for legitimate reasons relating
to the welfare of the child.
Because of the critics and for other reasons, relatively few states
passed statutes requiring the mediation of custody disputes. This
Article looks at child custody outcomes in a jurisdiction with
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mandatory mediation of custody disputes-Forsyth County, North
Carolina. To test the thesis of mandatory mediation critics, the
study analyzes custody outcomes in an entire population of parties
involved with the courts in custody disputes in 2002. The data
reveals no increase in the incidence of joint physical custody with
mediation. To the contrary, mothers received sole physical custody
more often in mandatory mediation than they did either in lawyer-
negotiated settlements or in litigation. On the other hand, the model
of mediation used in North Carolina avoided the most serious
concerns of mediation opponents: giving mediators the power to
make recommendations to the court and excluding lawyers from the
mediation process. This study suggests that with certain safeguards
in place, mandatory mediation deserves another look as a means to
help resolve high conflict custody disputes.
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As a nation,' indeed, as a world,2 we are not satisfied with how
we resolve disputed issues of child custody. In this country, for
example, we continue to experiment with different processes and
different personnel 3 as we search for better ways to serve that elusive
goal, "the best interests of the child." While there is a consensus that
we should resolve custody disputes in the best interests of the child,
the statutory standard that most states articulate, there certainly is no
consensus on the processes that will achieve it.
At one stage of our national experiment, we appeared to
conclude that mediation offered the most promise for resolving
custody disputes. Mediation proponents insisted that the adversary
process and the lawyers who practiced it created acrimony between
the parents, acrimony that decreased the chances that parents would
cooperate in post-separation parenting. No sooner had proponents
focused on mediation, however, than its detractors warned that
mediation posed a dangerous threat to the custody process. These
detractors, the most vocal of whom were feminist scholars, found that
mandatory mediation posed the most serious peril.
Most of all, opponents feared that mandatory mediation created
artificial incentives for parties to agree to joint physical custody, or
the significant sharing of parenting time by both parents.4 While
commentators generally applauded joint physical custody for parents
committed to it, opponents of routine use of mediation argued that it
would force equal parenting on parents in inappropriate cases.
Circumstances might advise against joint physical custody, for
example, for parents whose high conflict made it difficult to
coordinate the child's living arrangements in two households. Also,
for parents whose approaches to discipline varied dramatically, joint
physical custody might confuse an already troubled child. Most
dramatically, domestic violence might make joint custody not only ill-
1. For some of the experimentation within the United States, see infra notes 247-51.
2. For a description of the international conference on high conflict divorce, known
as the Wingspread Conference, see Sarah H. Ramsey, Rep., The Wingspread Report and
Action Plan, High-Conflict Custody Cases: Reforming the System for Children, 39 FAM.
CT. REV. 146 (2001). For more of the comparative law on custody, see, for example,
Patricia L. Sullivan, Culture, Divorce, and Family Mediation in Hong Kong, 43 FAM. CT.
REV. 109 (2005).
3. For a discussion of some of the emerging actors-parenting coordinators, court
evaluators, and others-see infra notes 248-51.
4. For a description of many of the relevant terms, including mandatory mediation
and joint physical custody, see infra Part II. For how the Article defines joint physical
custody, using 123 overnights as a benchmark, see infra note 188.
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advised but dangerous. For any number of reasons, joint physical
custody might be inappropriate in a particular case.
Opponents feared that mediators and the mediation process
would push joint physical custody and that in those cases in which it
was inappropriate, mothers and the children for whom they had been
primary caretakers would be the losers.5 To stem the tide of
mandatory mediation, opponents argued that power imbalances in
the parents' relationship, whether from domestic violence or other
factors, would carry over to mediation. Opponents feared that
mediators, committed to neutrality, would not redress the imbalances.
Moreover, opponents argued that mediators demonstrated a bias
favoring joint physical custody. According to opponents, with this
bias and mediators' natural tendency to promote settlements,
mediators would pressure mothers to agree to joint physical custody
even when mothers thought that equal parenting time would not
further the best interests of the child.
Over twenty years have passed since mediation opponents began
to predict that mandatory mediation would lead to less physical
custody for mothers. This Article tests the opponents' predictions in
a state where we might expect to see their worst fears happen: a
state, namely North Carolina, in which statutes mandate the
mediation of child custody disputes.6
To test the predictions, this Article looks at a population
involved with the court in a custody dispute in a judicial district in
North Carolina-the twenty-first judicial district'-and analyzes the
custody records of this population. In particular, the Article zeroes in
on the first custody resolution event of this population filed between
1997 and 2005. As explained in Part V, these custody resolution
5. For the link between mediators and mediation on the one hand and joint physical
custody on the other, see infra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
6. The General Assembly established a pilot program for child custody mediation in
Mecklenburg County in 1983. See LAURA F. DONNELLY & REBECCA G. EBRON, N.C.
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, THE CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION MEDIATION
PROGRAM IN NORTH CAROLINA: AN EVALUATION OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION AND
EFFECTS 1 [hereinafter EVALUATION OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION], available at
http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/CPrograms/Child/Documents/custvisitmedrept.pdf. In
1989, the General Assembly authorized statewide implementation of the program. Act of
Aug. 12, 1989, ch. 795, § 15, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 2912 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-
494 (2005)). Today the program exists in thirty judicial districts, comprising sixty of North
Carolina's 100 counties. Child Custody Mediation: Existing Programs, NORTH
CAROLINA COURT SYSTEM [hereinafter Existing Programs], http://www.nccourts.org/
Citizens/CPrograms/Child/Default.asp?topic=7 (last visited Aug. 27, 2007).
7. For a description of this district, comprised of Forsyth County, see infra notes
161-66 and accompanying text.
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events manifested themselves either in an agreement reached in
mandatory mediation, a lawyer-negotiated settlement filed with the
court, or a court order entered as a result of litigation. While we
gathered much information about the parents and children in this
population, the analysis of the data focuses on the comparisons
among these three different ways of resolving the custody issue-
mediation ("mediation"), lawyer-negotiated settlements
("settlement"), and orders resulting from litigation ("litigation")-
especially in relation to the issue of physical custody.8 From the files
of the families comprising our population, the data debunks some
conventional wisdom.
The comparison of the three types of custody resolution events-
mediation, settlement, and litigation-reveals that in this mandatory
mediation jurisdiction, mothers did not receive less physical custody
in mediation. On the contrary, in our study, in a comparison of those
three types of custody resolution events, mothers received primary
physical custody more often in mediation than they did in either
settlements or litigation.9
The findings belie another widely-held belief about the
prevalence of joint physical custody. Opponents of mandatory
mediation also warned that mediators would promote joint physical
custody and that equal sharing of physical custody would become the
norm, regardless of whether the circumstances warranted such an
arrangement. Again, to the contrary, in our study, custody disputes
ended in joint physical custody in less than 16% of the cases.
Moreover, joint physical custody appeared more often in lawyer-
negotiated settlements than it did either in mediation or litigation."
This data, however, does not lead to the conclusion that the
opponents of mandatory mediation had no cause for concern. As this
Article explores, the mediation process that most worried the early
opponents of mandatory mediation has almost disappeared and, in
fact, never took hold in North Carolina." In other states, in the early
days of custody mediation, the mediator was also the evaluator who
made recommendations to the court on how to resolve the custody
8. The study labels the agreements reached in mandatory mediation as "mediation";
the agreements reached through lawyer-negotiated settlements as "settlement"; and the
orders entered as a result of litigation as "litigation."
9. See infra Table 5. The numbers in Table 5 indicate that the mother received
primary physical custody in 83.1% (69/83) of the mediated cases; 69.5% (82/118) of the
lawyer-negotiated settlements; and 66.4% (81/122) of the litigated cases. Id.
10. Id.
11. See infra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
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dispute when the mediation failed to result in agreement. 2 Now
rejected as the norm, 3 the mediator in North Carolina never held this
dual status. In fact, custody mediation in North Carolina has always
provided confidentiality and privilege for the proceedings. 4 The
mediator lets the court know whether the parties met and whether
they reached agreement but does not file anything to influence
subsequent proceedings. Moreover, the mediator cannot sanction a
party for failing to reach an agreement that may seem desirable to the
mediator. Because the parties are free to reject the mediator's
suggestions, the custody mediator in North Carolina has no leverage
over the parties, at least not over parties who understand the
mediation process. 15 Even if a mediator favors joint physical custody
as the way to reach settlement, the mediator has no effective threat to
pressure a parent knowledgeable of the rules into "agreeing" to it.
Opponents of mandatory mediation also feared a process where
lawyers would have no role. Indeed, much of the early commentary
about custody mediation discouraged lawyers from participating. 6
Again, this model never took hold in North Carolina. While lawyers
in North Carolina usually do not participate in the actual mediation
sessions, mediators in North Carolina encourage the parties to consult
with lawyers before the parties execute an agreement. 7 Moreover,
our data is unusual in one respect: in a high percentage of our cases,
one or both parents were represented by counsel. 8 National studies
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-13.1(e)-(f) (2005); see infra text accompanying note 79
(noting limited exceptions to confidentiality rule).
15. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., LOCAL RULES FOR THE MEDIATION OF CUSTODY AND VISITATION
DISPUTES, NORTH CAROLINA CUSTODY AND VISITATION MEDIATION PROGRAM,
Twenty-First Judicial District, pt. V(G) (1999) [hereinafter LOCAL RULES]. For the
statewide rules, which also encourage the parties to consult a lawyer, see N.C. ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE COURTS, UNIFORM RULES REGULATING MEDIATION OF CHILD
CUSTODY AND VISITATION DISPUTES UNDER THE NORTH CAROLINA CUSTODY AND
VISITATION PROGRAM: CUSTODY AND VISITATION MEDIATION PROGRAM
PROCEDURES MANUAL 9 (1999) [hereinafter UNIFORM RULES]; infra text accompanying
notes 75-76.
18. See infra Part V(B) and Table 2. As Table 2 indicates, 97.4% of plaintiffs and
72.6% of defendants were represented. The twenty-first judicial district does not have a
family court, a factor that helps explain the low percentage of unrepresented parties. The
number of pro se family law litigants has increased everywhere, but there has been an
alarming increase in family courts. In family courts, where court personnel are more
accustomed to the nature of the disputes and the litigants, the court personnel may
indirectly encourage pro se representation. These personnel, with their familiarity with
the system and the litigants, may be more inclined to assist the litigants, which in turn
1634 [Vol. 85
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have reported the trend toward pro se appearances in family law
matters, and this trend has carried over to custody disputes. 9 In this
study, however, most of the parties were represented by lawyers, a
factor which may help to explain some of the outcomes. In particular,
to the extent that opponents of mandatory mediation feared that
mediators would pressure mothers to agree to joint physical custody
in inappropriate cases, perhaps there is no reason to worry about
mediator influence-as long as the mothers have lawyers.2 0
In sum, in our study, mothers did not routinely agree to joint
physical custody in mandatory mediation, and joint physical custody
did not emerge as the norm in either mediation, lawyer-negotiated
settlements, or litigation. In this Article we explore why
commentators predicted more joint physical custody, particularly
against mothers' wishes, and why we did not find these results in our
data. Part I of the Article traces the alternative dispute resolution
movement, particularly as it began to focus on the law of custody.
Part II provides background on the law of child custody and the
process of mandatory mediation. Part III sets out the arguments on
both sides of the mandatory mediation debate. As developed in Part
IV, much of the empirical work on custody mediation focused on
issues other than physical custody but generally suggested that the
dire predictions were unfounded. Part V describes the methodology
and results of this study, particularly, the data and analysis supporting
the conclusions that mediation does not decrease primary physical
custody for mothers nor lead to more arrangements involving joint
physical custody. In Part VI, the Article offers some explanations for
the results, and the conclusion suggests some implications of the
results and the need for further studies.
I. THE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MOVEMENT AND ITS
FOCUS ON CHILD CUSTODY
Alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") offers mediation as one
of many alternatives to litigation. Through mediation, a neutral third
party identifies issues between the parties and helps the parties
increases the incidence of pro se representation. See Steven K. Berenson, A Family Law
Residency Program?: A Modest Proposal in Response to the Burdens Created by Self-
Represented Litigants in Family Court, 33 RUTGERs L.J. 105, 145-64 (2001) (proposing a
program for recent law graduates to address the legal needs of people who would
otherwise represent themselves in family court).
19. See Connie J.A. Beck & Bruce D. Sales, A Critical Reappraisal of Divorce
Mediation Research and Policy, 6 PSCYHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 989, 992-95 (2000).
20. See infra Tables 5, 6, and 7 and accompanying text.
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propose solutions to the problems between them.21 The method is
thousands of years old in some parts of Asia and has deep roots
among adherents of certain faiths, like Jews and Quakers.22 For
family law, however, it is a relative newcomer.
Some researchers have traced mediation in the family law setting
to the early 1960's when court personnel began experimenting with
informal methods of addressing conflicts between divorcing couples.23
As parties came to the court to file their lawsuits, clerks and other
officers conducted informal sessions with the aim of reducing the
conflict between the parties and perhaps prompting reconciliations.24
These efforts, the precursors to formal mediation services, gained
steam from the divorce reform movement of the late 1960's.
The divorce reform movement sought to replace the system of
fault-based divorce. Indeed, by the time no-fault divorce swept
through the country in the 1970's, the fault-based divorce system had
completely broken so that the law on the books did not reflect the law
in practice.25 As a nation we simply rejected the basic premise of
fault-based divorce: that divorce involved an innocent spouse pitted
against a guilty spouse in an adversary proceeding, with a judgment of
divorce as the prize for the innocent victor. 6 Even though the law
varied among the states, all the states had various substantive and
procedural rules to protect the basic premise.27
21. JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 7 (1984).
22. Daniel G. Brown, Divorce and Family Mediation: History, Review, Future
Directions, 20 FAM. CT. REV. 1, 1 (1982).
23. Id. at 11-13; see also Jay Folberg, A Mediation Overview: History and Dimension
of Practice, MEDIATION Q., Sept. 1983, at 3, 5-6 (describing divorce mediation efforts in
the 1960's and the 1970's); Joan B. Kelly, Carl Zlatchin & Joel Shawn, Divorce Mediation:
Process, Prospects, and Professional Issues, in PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHIATRY, AND THE
LAW: A CLINICAL AND FORENSIC HANDBOOK 243, 245 (C.P. Ewing ed., 1985) (noting
that the emergence of divorce-related mediation coincided with the "gradual acceptance
of no-fault divorce statutes" in the 1970's).
24. CONNIE J.A. BECK & BRUCE D. SALES, FAMILY MEDIATION: FACTS, MYTHS,
AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 5-7 (2001).
25. For the ways the system was "broken," see infra notes 26-39 and accompanying
text.
26. 2 SUZANNE REYNOLDS, LEE'S NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 7.2, at 9 (5th
ed. 1999); see sources cited infra note 29. For the participation of lawyers in
manufacturing grounds for divorce, see Joel S. Newman, Legal Advice Toward Illegal
Ends, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 287, 304-08 (1994) (discussing whether lawyers were
disciplined for their roles in the fraud on the courts in cases trying to circumvent the fault
grounds).
27. See, e.g., 2 REYNOLDS, supra note 26, § 7.4, at 16 (discussing the "injured spouse"
requirement for a divorce in North Carolina).
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Hard as the law on the books tried to protect the premise, the
law in practice did not.28 In contested divorces, judges granted
divorces with weak evidence of the grounds. In uncontested cases,
parties colluded in fabricating grounds for divorce. As explained in a
treatise on North Carolina family law, the discrepancy between the
law on the books and in practice "encouraged an unholy conspiracy
among the parties, their lawyer, and the judge hearing the case.
Unscrupulous lawyers advised their clients how to manufacture
'evidence' and then coached them in perjury. For their part, judges
granted divorces on the basis of evidence that everyone recognized
for the perjury it was."'2 9
In light of the practices that circumvented fault-based statutes,
some would say that no-fault divorce replaced fault-based divorce
long before no-fault statutes brought an official end to divorce based
on fault grounds. Nevertheless, it was not until no-fault divorce
statutes replaced fault-based divorce statutes that proponents of
ADR seized the moment and began in earnest to promote mediation
as the likely successor to adversary divorce proceedings. Some of
these proponents were lawyers who feared that the divorce rates
would soar and believed that the civil justice system needed to offer
conciliation services in an effort to keep marriages together.0
Coalitions of lawyers, social workers, family therapists, and family
mediators drafted training materials and model rules for family
mediation and developed divorce mediation centers.31 Scholars from
a variety of fields-cultural anthropology, sociology, social
psychology, as well as law-contributed to the movement.32  In
hindsight, in the waning days of fault-based divorce, the process was
probably not as adversarial as it appeared so that the formal change
to no-fault divorce probably did not work as big a difference as some
28. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 577 (3d ed.
2005).
29. 2 REYNOLDS, supra note 26, § 7.2, at 9-10. For example, see FRIEDMAN, supra
note 28, at 577-78, describing the practice in New York of a man who wanted a divorce
paying a woman to disrobe in a motel room in which a photographer would capture the
"evidence." See also Note, Collusive and Consensual Divorce and the New York Anomaly,
36 COLUM. L. REV. 1121, 1127-28 (1936) (reporting widespread belief that legislators,
judges, other court personnel, lawyers, parties, and others colluded to concoct evidence in
divorce cases to satisfy the requirements of New York's fault-based law).
30. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 305(b), 9A U.L.A. 242 (1998)
(providing the court the option of continuing the dissolution action and, on request of
either party or on its own, ordering a "conciliation conference" if the judge believes there
is a "prospect of reconciliation").
31. BECK & SALES, supra note 24, at 5-9.
32. Id. at 8.
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believed.33 Nevertheless, the proponents of ADR worried that
removing fault as the central feature of divorce law removed the legal
framework for deciding the issues presented by divorce, and they
tried to fill the void that they believed had been created.
While mediation became a part of the divorce landscape in
general, it took on the most significance for child custody. During the
days of fault-based divorce, the law had tried to keep the fault
relevant to dissolving the marriage distinct from the custody issue. As
explained in one North Carolina case,
[I]n a custody proceeding it is not the function of the courts to
punish or reward a parent by withholding or awarding custody
of minor children; the function of the court in such a proceeding
is to diligently seek to act for the best interests and welfare of
the minor child.34
The courts did not always manage to keep fault out of custody,35
however, and when mediation emerged as the alternative to the
adversary divorce system, reformers were more than eager to bring it
first to the issue of custody.
The proponents of mediation offered a number of reasons why
mediation should become the preferred process for resolving family
disputes in general and custody disputes in particular. Mediation,
they argued, offered benefits for the legal system. According to the
proponents, mediation would resolve custody disputes more quickly,
less expensively, and privately.36
Even more importantly, mediation offered benefits for the
parents because it empowered them to settle their own disputes. The
mediators would help the parties resolve their conflicts and in the
course of the mediation sessions teach them some skills they could
use in later disputes. The parents could air their grievances, assisted
by a neutral third party, who could help make sure that the other
parent heard the grievance. The process would put the interests of
the children at the heart of the proceeding and keep the pArents'
attention focused on the children instead of their own conflicts.
Parents would like the process better and would therefore be more
satisfied with the results. The advocates for mediation did not stop
33. See Lee E. Teitelbaum & Laura DuPaix, Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Divorce: Natural Experimentation in Family Law, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1093, 1113 (1988)
(questioning just how adversarial most divorces were).
34. In re McCraw Children, 3 N.C. App. 390, 395, 165 S.E.2d 1, 4-5 (1969).
35. See 3 REYNOLDS, supra note 26, § 13.14(b), at 13-49 (discussing the effect of a
parent's sexual conduct on the custody issue).
36. See Beck & Sales, supra note 19, at 991.
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there: they predicted that obligors of child support would pay more
child support once mediation replaced the adversary system, that
non-custodial parents would maintain more post-separation contact
with their children, and that there would be fewer subsequent
disputes in mediated custody disputes. Most significantly, the
process, less conflict-ridden, would be more beneficial to children and
help their adjustment to divorce.37
The claims for the superiority of mediation over litigation
stemmed in part from the conclusion that lawyers hindered the
process of resolving custody disputes. Removing lawyers and
replacing them with mediators and other mental health professionals,
said some observers, would increase the chances of a good resolution
of custody disputes. Characterizing the typical custody lawyer as a
"bomber" who encouraged clients to make unreasonable demands,38
proponents of mediation argued that replacing lawyers with third
party neutrals, namely mediators, promised to reduce the acrimony
between the parties and promote amicable settlements of the custody
issue.3 9 Mediators, unlike most lawyers, had professional training in
family conflict and dispute resolution, and therefore mediation
offered a clearly superior alternative.4"
These kinds of claims for mediation help to explain the decisions
in some states to make child custody mediation mandatory. In 1980,
Massachusetts and Connecticut became the first states to mandate
custody mediation, and California followed in 1981.41
37. Id. at 991-92 (addressing most of the claimed benefits). For these and other
benefits, see also Robert Dingwall & John Eekelaar, A Wider Vision?, in DIVORCE
MEDIATION AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 168-82 (Robert Dingwall & John Eekelaar eds.,
1988). Though this Article concludes that custody mediation did not deliver all it
promised, that is not to say that we have lost confidence in mediation generally. On the
contrary, different communities are exploring the use of mediation in settings once
thought off-limits. John A. Martin & Steven Weller, Mediated Child Protection
Conferencing: Lessons from the Wisconsin Unified Family Court Project, JUDGES' J.,
Spring 2002, at 5 (describing projects in two counties in Wisconsin using mediated child
protection conferencing for civil and criminal child abuse cases); see also Nancy Ver
Steegh, Differentiating Types of Domestic Violence: Implications For Child Custody, 65
LA. L. REV. 1379, 1408 (2005) (distinguishing between intimate terrorism and situational
couple violence and concluding that custody mediation may be inappropriate in the
former while helpful in the latter).
38. Rudolph J. Gerber, Recommendation on Domestic Relations Reform, 32 ARIZ. L.
REV. 9, 13 (1990).
39. Id. at 16.
40. Beck & Sales, supra note 19, at 991.
41. Brown, supra note 22, at 18.
2007] 1639
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Obviously-especially in hindsight-there was no way for
mediation to live up to all that its proponents promised.42 As two
important scholars have observed, "advocates and academics often
expect too much from divorce law and policy," 43 and nowhere does
that appear to be more true than in the promises made about what
mediation would do for child custody.
II. CHILD CUSTODY AND MANDATORY MEDIATION:
BACKGROUND
High hopes for resolving child custody disputes are nothing new,
however. Reformers have continued to study the process, searching
for better approaches, simply because resolving these disputes is so
difficult. As judges and others involved in the process have
acknowledged, "One of the gravest responsibilities that can be placed
upon a court-and one of the most heart searching-is to determine
the proper custodian of a child."'
Despite the gravity of the issue, many of the terms in child
custody lack precision. The following gives some background on the
terms most significant for this Article:
A. Custody
While everyone acknowledges its importance, "custody" remains
a largely undefined term.4' As explained in a treatise on North
Carolina family law,
The North Carolina statutes, for example, do not define
"custody" nor many of the related terms. By common
understanding, custody of a minor child refers to all of the
rights and obligations related to giving care, providing
protection, and exercising control over a child. The law may
give some of the rights and obligations to one person, some to
another. Also, several kinds of custody may be simultaneously
in issue.46
42. As one proponent said of mediation, "There seems to be an undeniable power, if
not magic, to mediation. It almost seems heaven-sent." James Melamed, Attorneys and
Mediation: From Threat to Opportunity, MEDIATION Q., Spring 1989, at 13, 14.
43. ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 282 (1992).
44. Wall v. Hardee, 240 N.C. 465,467, 82 S.E.2d 269, 372 (1954).
45. See Patterson v. Taylor, 140 N.C. App. 91, 95-97, 535 S.E.2d 374, 377-78 (2000)
(commenting that the statutes fail to define joint custody and do not distinguish between
joint legal custody and joint physical custody).




"Legal custody" refers to the authority to make major decisions
about the child's life, decisions with long-term consequences, such as
those relating to secular and religious education and medical care.
A custodian may have the right to make all major decisions for the
child, in which case the person has "sole legal custody." By the same
token, persons may share the right to exercise this authority, in which
case the persons have "joint legal custody. '4  Moreover, the court
may allocate, or the parties may agree, to divide legal custody
between the custodians, giving the right to make certain decisions to
one parent, the right to make other decisions to the other parent.49
C. Physical Custody: Primary, Sole, or Joint Physical Custody
When the law uses the phrase "physical custody," it refers to the
rights of the custodian with whom the child resides. In recent years,
some commentators and legislatures have avoided the phrase
altogether, choosing instead to refer to "custodial responsibility"5 or
similar phrases. The phrase still appears, however, and refers to the
right and responsibilities associated with residing with and supervising
the child.5 In contrast to the long-term decisionmaking authorized by
legal custody, physical custody recognizes the authority to supervise
the day-to-day routine of the child's life.
A custodian may have primary, sole, or joint physical custody.
As explained in North Carolina commentary:
If the child resides only with one person for significant periods
of time, that person has "primary physical custody" or "sole
physical custody." If the child resides for significant periods of
time with two persons, these persons may have "joint physical
47. See, e.g., Patterson, 140 N.C. App. at 96, 535 S.E.2d at 378 (referring to the term).
48. For a recent case in North Carolina on the topic of legal custody, see generally
Diehl v. Diehl, 177 N.C. App. 642, 630 S.E.2d 25 (2006) (concluding that in awarding joint
legal custody the trial court erred in giving one parent all decisionmaking authority in the
absence of findings of fact justifying such a severe restriction on legal custody).
49. See MacLagan v. Klein, 123 N.C. App. 557, 565, 473 S.E.2d 778, 784 (1996)
(awarding responsibility for decisions about social activities to one parent, decisions about
religious training and practice to the other). For an opinion on allocating legal custody,
see generally Diehl, 177 N.C. App. 642,630 S.E.2d 25.
50. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08 (2002) [hereinafter LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION].
51. The Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA")
defines physical custody as "the physical care and supervision of a child." U.C.C.J.E.A.
§ 102(4) (1997); cf N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50A-102(14) (2005) (adopting UCCJEA definition
of physical custody). As the title indicates, however, this Act does not provide the process
for deciding custody but for exercising jurisdiction and for enforcing orders.
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custody." While the phrase "sole custody" often refers to the
person who has primary physical custody, "sole custody" may
refer either to "sole physical" or "sole legal" custody or both.52
D. Visitation
"Visitation," as it indicates, refers to a more limited right than
the right to physical custody. "A person with visitation rights has a
kind of custody of the child, and, indeed, the law may refer to
visitation as 'a lesser degree of custody' or as 'secondary custody.' ""
A court may carve up these rights in various ways or the parties may
agree to various allocations so that a person may have visitation rights
and certain rights associated with "legal custody."
For an issue as wrenching as custody, commentators seldom
reach consensus-except on the hope that the parents agree on how
to resolve it. The American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution, for example, encourage the parties to reach their
own "parenting plans, ''5 an approach that a number of states have
adopted.55
E. Mandatory Mediation
When the parents do not agree and enlist the aid of the court,
jurisdictions with mandatory mediation require the parties to appear
before a mediator-usually a court official-and attempt to reach
their own agreement on custody. The mandatory mediation
provisions may condition further access to the courts to the parties'
attempting to resolve their custody dispute through mediation.
Many of the features of the North Carolina approach have
become typical.56 The enabling legislation provides for statewide
rules to implement the program, which judicial districts may
supplement with local rules.57 The regulations require mediators to
52. 3 REYNOLDS, supra note 26, § 13.2, at 13-16. In this Article, we adopt the
definition of joint physical custody as custody in which the child spends at least 123
overnights with each parent. See infra note 188.
53. 3 REYNOLDS, supra note 26, § 13.2, at 13-16 & n.11 (citations omitted).
54. LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 50, § 2.05.
55. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.181(1) (West 2005).
56. In North Carolina, for example, mediators do not make recommendations on
outcomes when parties fail to reach an agreement. See infra note 79 and accompanying
text. For the observation that this practice has become the norm, see Beck & Sales, supra
note 19, at 1010. For other observations about features that have become typical that
reflect the North Carolina program, see generally Beck & Sales, supra note 19, at 1000-13.
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-494 to -495 (2005). For narrative on the program, see 3
REYNOLDS, supra note 26, § 13.77(a), at 13-148.
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have at least a master's degree in psychology, social work, family
counseling, or a comparable field. In practice, mediators in the
mandatory programs usually do not have law degrees.58 The statutes
also require a certain number of hours of training in mediation as well
as professional training and experience in child development or
family relations.59 The program operates at no cost to the parties.6'
Even within North Carolina, the judicial districts vary somewhat
on how the parties get to mediation. In some districts, the filing of
the custody action triggers a waiting period, at the conclusion of
which the court orders the parties to an orientation session, followed
by a private mediation session.6" In other districts, providing for more
control by the parties and their lawyers, the filing of the action
triggers a referral to the orientation session, with the parties
scheduling their private session without a waiting period.62 Forsyth
County, which comprises the twenty-first judicial district in North
Carolina, follows the latter model.63
The statutes and implementing rules provide for waiver of
mediation for good cause shown.' The statute provides a non-
exclusive list of reasons, referring specifically to undue hardship
because of distance from the meeting site, agreement to voluntary
mediation, history of abuse or neglect of the child, history of
alcoholism or drug abuse, allegations of domestic violence, and
charges of severe psychological, psychiatric, or emotional problems.
The parties usually initiate the request to waive mediation. In
addition, the court may waive mediation on its own,65 or the mediator
may move for a waiver.66
Unless the parties receive a waiver, they must participate in the
general orientation session and in one private mediation session.67
Because the court has ordered the parties to the sessions, the court
58. Interview with Katherine Alsehuler, Child Custody Mediator, Wake County,
Child Custody Mediation Program, in Raleigh, N.C. (May 25, 2007).
59. § 7A-494(c).
60. In some states, the parties share the costs. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-
39(4) (Supp. 2007).
61. A publication of the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts
synthesizes the various approaches. See EVALUATION OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION, supra
note 6, at 5.
62. Id.
63. LOCAL RULES, supra note 17.
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1(c) (2005); UNIFORM RULES, supra note 17, at 7.
65. § 50-13.1(c).
66. Standards of Practice for Mediators in the North Carolina Mandatory Custody
Mediation Program, in UNIFORM RULES, supra note 17, app. b, at 20.
67. UNIFORM RULES, supra note 18, at 8.
20071 1643
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85
has the authority to hold a party in contempt for failing to appear.
Instead of using this power, the judge may choose instead to order the
party back to mediation or allow the party to forego it and pursue
litigation.69
At the private mediation session, the parties attempt through the
mediator to reach an agreement over whatever custody issues are in
dispute. In the North Carolina program, the mediator may address
only custody issues, however, with financial issues strictly segregated
to other processes.7 " The disputes may arise in initial custody
arrangements or in subsequent conflicts over how to modify them.7"
Usually the sessions last less than two hours.72 Rarely do the parties
have more than one or two sessions, but with court approval, the
parties may schedule more than three.73 The goal of the sessions is to
reach a "parenting agreement," the term that the North Carolina
statutes give to the agreement that parties reach in court-ordered
custody mediation. 4 If mediation results in a parenting agreement,
the mediator helps the parties put the agreement into writing.75 The
mediator mails a copy of the proposed parenting agreement to the
parties and their lawyers and encourages the parties to review the
parenting agreement with their lawyers.76
In several ways, the North Carolina version of mandatory
mediation makes the failure to reach an agreement risk-free.77 In the
first place, after the party attends the private mediation session, the
party may then withdraw with no penalty for failing to reach an
agreement. 8 At that stage, the party may litigate the custody dispute.
Equally as important, the mediator does not make any
recommendation to the court to try to influence subsequent
proceedings. In fact, the statutes governing mediation provide
68. Id.
69. For the effect of the lack of consequences, see infra notes 77-79 and
accompanying text.
70. § 50-13.1(b) (providing that the court refer to mediation issues relating to custody,
not economic issues); see UNIFORM RULES, supra note 17, at 7 (naming only "unresolved
issues as to custody or visitation of minor child" as appropriate for mediation).
71. § 50-13.1(b). The statute requires mediation also for motions seeking
enforcement, like contempt. Id.
72. UNIFORM RULES, supra note 17, at 8.
73. Id.
74. § 50-13.1(h).
75. UNIFORM RULES, supra note 17, at 9.
76. Id.
77. Contrast the approach of some states, at least in other versions of mandatory
mediation, infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
78. UNIFORM RULES, supra note 17, at 8.
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confidentiality and privilege for the communications exchanged
during the sessions, with exceptions only for criminal conduct or
other conduct amounting to abuse or neglect.79
The North Carolina version of mandatory mediation, in effect,
simply offers another opportunity for the parties to reach their own
agreement. As enacted, the program contemplates the participation
of lawyers and attaches no penalties for parties who refuse to reach
an agreement. Even parties who refuse to participate may face no
consequences.80 With this version of mandatory mediation in mind,
the firestorm of criticism that accompanied mandatory mediation for
custody comes as a surprise. The mandatory mediation model that
triggered the controversy, however, was much different.
III. THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF MANDATORY MEDIATION
Feminist scholars rejected the notion that mandatory mediation
offered salvation for child custody and warned instead that it
threatened the proper resolving of custody disputes. Early in divorce
reform, Martha Fineman cautioned that no-fault divorce in general
left women with serious economic disadvantages, 8' and she insisted
that mandatory mediation in custody proceedings threatened further
disadvantage to women as the family dissolved. 2
Though she was the most prominent, Fineman was not the first
to challenge the use of mandatory mediation for custody disputes.
Even before mediation focused on custody, commentators cautioned
about the use of ADR for poor or otherwise disempowered
79. § 50-13.1(e)-(f).
80. See infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
81. See Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and
Social Change: A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of
Divorce, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 789, 827-30 (1983). In this law review article, Fineman argued
that fault-based divorce at least offered some leverage to the economically disadvantaged
spouse as long as she remained the innocent spouse. See id. 848-49, 883. Without fault-
based divorce, the innocent spouse had lost her leverage. See id. Fineman later expanded
her article into a book, MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE
RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991).
82. Martha L. Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988); Martha L.
Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policymaking: Custody
Determinations at Divorce, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 107 (1987). For another important work
with this theme, see LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE
UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN
AMERICA (1985). While some have cast doubt on certain of Weitzman's claims, see, e.g.,
Saul D. Huffman & Greg J. Duncan, What Are the Economic Consequences of Divorce, 25
DEMOGRAPHY 641, 641 (1988), her basic points appear sound.
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participants.83 In the setting of custody, however, the tide bringing
mediation to custody inspired a tidal wave opposing it.
The opponents voiced a number of interrelated concerns, some
having to do with the traits of the parents, some with the process, and
still others with the effect on the substantive law of custody. On the
traits of the parents, all of the opponents pointed out that the social
and economic circumstances of a majority of wives left them at power
disadvantages with their husbands. The opponents argued that these
power imbalances would carry over to mediation, and the
''agreements" that issued from mediation would not represent real
agreements on the part of many of the mothers executing them. 4
Knowing that a "successful" mediation was supposed to end in an
agreement, too many mothers would succumb to the demands of their
typically more powerful husbands. Even if wives did not give in to
the demands of their husbands, other traits might work to the
disadvantage of mothers. Opponents feared that women's "relational
sense of self" might cause them, if forced to mediate, to work on
maintaining a connection with their ex-husbands, even against their
self-interests.85 In addition, opponents worried about the "Solomon
syndrome."86  When the mediators had indicated the wisdom of a
certain custody arrangement, mothers might feel pressure to agree to
that arrangement even if the mothers thought it was ill-advised.
Otherwise, the mediators might become irritated, argued the
opponents of mandatory mediation, causing some mothers to fear-
83. Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice
in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1360-61 (1985).
84. See, e.g., Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics
of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441, 445-46 (1992); Harriet Cohen, Mediation in Divorce:
Boon or Bane, WOMEN'S ADVOC., July 1983, at 1; Richard E. Crouch, The Dark Side of
Mediation: Still Unexplored, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 339 (Howard Davidson et al. eds., 1982); Trina Grillo, The Mediation
Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1592 (1991); Carol
Lefcourt, Women, Mediation and Family Law, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 266 (1984);
Laurie Woods, Mediation: A Backlash to Women's Progress on Family Law Issues, 19
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 431 (1985).
85. Grillo, supra note 84, at 1550. See generally Janet Rifkin, Mediation from a
Feminist Perspective: Promises and Problems, 2 LAW & INEQ. 21, 22 (1984); Martha
Shaffer, Divorce Mediation: A Feminist Perspective, 46 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 162
(1988).
86. The phrase refers to a mother's willingness to sacrifice for the welfare of her child.
In the Biblical story of King Solomon, the good ruler manifested his wisdom as he listened
to two women who both claimed a baby. Solomon demanded that his attendant bring a
sword and ordered the attendant to sever the baby in half and give one half to each
woman. One woman accepted the proposal while the other woman begged the king to
spare the child and give the baby to the other woman. King Solomon decreed that the
baby was the child of the woman who asked him to spare the child's life. 1 Kings 3:16-28.
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perhaps irrationally-that the mediators' displeasure might result in
their losing custodial time. Because of their care orientation, mothers
might reach an "agreement" out of a fear that they otherwise might
lose more time with their children.87
All of these concerns-power imbalances, relational sense of self,
the Solomon syndrome-were even more acute if the mothers were
victims of domestic violence. For victims of domestic violence,
opponents thought mandatory mediation was particularly wrong-
headed.88 In fact, for domestic violence victims, these concerns
became acute.
Others opposed mediation for related reasons about the process
itself. Because mediators were supposed to remain neutral, they
would not be inclined to correct any power imbalances, even if they
became aware of them.89 Also because of mediators' training, the
sessions would tend to be person-oriented and forward-looking when
the best interests of the child might warrant a look backward to the
custodial arrangement and the conduct of the parties before the
separation.9° Moreover, the parties might need to discuss the history
of their relationship, something which mediation actively
discourages. 91 Also, any benefit that might come from mediation was
unlikely to occur in mandatory mediation. Because the docket of the
court-ordered programs left little time for extended sessions,
87. Bryan, supra note 84, at 480.
88. Grillo, supra note 84, at 1584. For a later critique of mediation and domestic
violence, see Ver Steegh, supra note 37, at 1406-08. See also Lauri Boxer-Macomber,
Revisiting the Impact of California's Mandatory Custody Mediation Program on Victims of
Domestic Violence Through a Feminist Positionality Lens, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 883,
884 (2003) (arguing that many of the potential harms for domestic violence victims initially
posed by California's mandatory mediation model have since been "eliminated, mitigated,
or should be reconsidered from a new standpoint").
89. Bryan, supra note 84, at 498. For support that mediators do not address power
imbalances, see generally JOHN M. HAYNES, DIVORCE MEDIATION: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE FOR THERAPISTS AND COUNSELORS (1981); CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE
MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT (1996). For
a more recent concern about mediator training, see the conclusion by Dean Katharine
Bartlett, reporter for the ALI's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, that the ALI
did not favor mandatory mediation because "the quality of mediation nationwide was not
yet at the level to justify a broad, mandatory approach." Katharine T. Bartlett, U.S.
Custody Law and Trends in the Context of the ALl Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 5, 15 (2002).
90. Teitelbaum & DuPaix, supra note 33, at 1117.
91. Grillo, supra note 84, at 1563-64, 1574-75.
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mandatory mediation would not provide the time necessary for
therapeutic interventions.92
Most of all, however, the opponents rejected mandatory
mediation because of a perceived mediator bias towards joint physical
custody. To the opponents, there could be no doubt of this bias,93 and
they cited mediator training manuals indicating that for mediators,
"joint physical custody" was the code phrase for "best interests of the
child."94  In fact, the momentum for mediation coincided with the
momentum for joint physical custody.
As a principle of family law, joint physical custody, or the sharing
of significant custodial time with both parents, appeared, and then
took hold, relatively quickly. Some trace the joint custody movement
to a 1978 work by two disgruntled fathers, who resented their own
custody arrangements.95 Whatever its origins, the principle gained a
foothold, and states responded with statutes that promoted awards of
joint custody. In some states, the statutes directed the court to
presume an award of joint custody, with the burden on the objecting
parent to rebut the presumption.96 In other states, legislatures
92. Bryan, supra note 84, at 501. Mediators in these programs would have to keep the
sessions focused, and the drive for efficiency would undermine any gain to be had from
mediation. Id. at 511-12.
93. Bryan, supra note 84, at 491; Linda K. Girdner, Custody Mediation in the United
States: Empowerment or Social Control?, 3 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 134, 142 (1989) (noting
that many private mediators advocate for joint custody as the "best interests" of the child)
[hereinafter Girdner, Empowerment or Social Control?]; Linda K. Girdner, Adjudication
and Mediation: A Comparison of Custody Decision-Making Processes Involving Third
Parties, J. DIVORCE, Spring/Summer 1985, at 33, 42 (noting mediators' common
preference for coparenting); Grillo, supra note 84, at 1594 (reporting that mediators steer
clients toward joint custody); Lois Vanderkooi & Jessica Pearson, Mediating Divorce
Disputes: Mediator Behaviors, Styles and Roles, 32 FAM. REL. 557, 560 (1983) (describing
the "distributive solutions" proposed by mediators, including "log rolling" where the
parents split physical custody on important dates such as holidays and birthdays).
94. See, e.g., DONALD T. SAPOSNEK, MEDIATING CHILD CUSTODY: A SYSTEMATIC
GUIDE FOR FAMILY THERAPISTS, COURT COUNSELORS, ATrORNEYS, AND JUDGES 81
(1985); Andrew Schepard, Melissa D. Philbrick & Dvora Wolff Rabino, Ground Rules for
Custody Mediation and Modification, 48 ALB. L. REV. 616 (1984); see also Mary Tall
Shattuck, Mandatory Mediation, in DIVORCE MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 191,
204 (Jay Folberg & Ann Milne eds., 1988) (explaining that parties need to find their
solutions within the state "statutory standard that calls for close and continuing contact
between the child and both his parents").
95. Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody: The Parent-Child
Relationship and the Current Cycle of Family Law Reform, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 455 n.1
(1984) (citing MEL ROMAN & WILLIAM HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT 75 (1978)).
96. For the first presumption as it appeared in California in 1979, see CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 4600.5(b) (Deering 1981) (repealed 1994) (presuming joint custody even in a disputed
case). For the presumption which remains in the current version of the Florida custody
statute, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West 2006) (requiring shared parenting
unless the court finds the arrangement detrimental to the child).
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adopted "friendly parent provisions" that instructed the court to
consider how willing a parent was to promote contact with the other
parent.97 As used in some states, these friendly parent provisions
applied pressure. If a parent thought that opposing joint custody
might appear "unfriendly," the parent would agree to joint custody to
avoid a judge awarding custody to the "friendlier" parent.98
A number of factors paved the way for this bandwagon for joint
physical custody, factors which combined to make judges eager for
any presumption to help decide custody cases. In the first place, the
divorce rate was rising. 9 As divorce affected increasing numbers of
children, °° everyone in the system felt pressure to handle custody
cases better. Second, several important longitudinal studies published
in the late 1970's and early 1980's reported the devastating effects of
divorce on children, 10' and these reports stimulated interest in
changing the custody paradigm. Third, increasing numbers of
mothers in the workforce had altered, at least somewhat, traditional
parenting roles. In this light, joint physical custody simply responded
to the realities of modern parenting.' Fourth, in the decades before
this attention to joint physical custody, the substantive law of custody
had rejected the tender years' presumption, the presumption that the
court should award custody of a young child to the mother. 103 As
compared to the tender years' presumption, the indeterminate "best
interests of the child" standard left the courts struggling with little
97. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(1)(c) (West Supp. 2006) (directing court to
"consider the denial by one parent of the child's opportunity for maximum continuing
contact with the other parent, without just cause, a significant factor in determining the
property custody arrangement").
98. 3 REYNOLDS, supra note 26, § 13.60 at 13-122. For an analysis of the effect of
these statutes in one state, see Margaret F. Brinig, Penalty Defaults in Family Law: The
Case of Child Custody, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779, 804-13 (2006) (analyzing the shared-
custody preference enacted in Oregon and concluding that the statutes had only a limited
effect on joint physical custody awards). For a similar conclusion about custody
settlements, see Margaret F. Brinig, Unhappy Contracts: The Case of Divorce Settlements,
1:2 REV. L. & ECON. 241, 249-61 (2005) (analyzing settlements in a county in Iowa and
concluding that what the parties might have expected in litigation did not significantly
affect the custody terms of their settlements).
99. Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 95, at 458.
100. See Paul C. Glick, Children of Divorced Parents, in Demographic Perspective, 35 J.
SOC. ISSUES 170, 170, 174 (1979).
101. JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP:
HOW CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980); E. Mavis Hetherington et.
al., The Aftermath of Divorce, in MOTHER/CHILD, FATHER/CHILD RELATIONSHIPS 149
(Joseph H. Stevens, Jr. & Marilyn Matthews eds., 1978).
102. Jana B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L.
REV. 497, 501 (1988).
103. 3 REYNOLDS, supra note 26, § 13.6, at 13-30 to -32.
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guidance on how to make custody decisions. In this void, joint
physical custody offered something determinant.' 4
With these factors as a backdrop, for opponents of mediation,
mediator bias in favor of joint physical custody created the perfect
storm to overwhelm the fair resolution of child custody at divorce.
The opponents foresaw a world where joint physical custody would
become the norm even if high conflict or other factors made shared
physical custody inappropriate. In fact, in one of her important
articles on the topic, Fineman named the "helping professions" as the
people who deserved most of the blame for constructing the joint
physical custody bandwagon. °5 She put social workers and others
trained in mental health and the behavioral sciences, including
mediators, in the category of the helping professions and accused
them of feeding "the joint custody norm" that devalued the primary
caregiver. °6  The helping professions, she insisted, had wrested
custody from the law and lawyers and claimed custody as their own
by posing as the facilitators of reform.
Fineman found most pernicious the way the helping professions
had changed the discourse about custody. No longer was a custody
dispute a legal event: instead, it was an emotional crisis calling for
mental health professionals, not lawyers." 7 A "good" parent became
the parent most cooperative in getting through the crisis and getting
on with her life. In this setting, if a parent refused to cooperate, that
refusal labeled the parent pathological.' Fineman concluded that
custodial mothers lost their voice in the custody debate because they
could not express their concerns "through existing and accepted
discourses or rhetorical concepts."'0 9 And according to Fineman and
others, the cooperation the mediator wanted facilitated an agreement
reflecting joint physical custody: the shared parenting ideal. To the
extent the substantive law gave the mother an advantage as the
primary caregiver, mediation took it away."0 If the mother did not
104. Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 95, at 464.
105. Fineman, supra note 82, at 728.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 743-44; see also Girdner, Empowerment or Social Control?, supra note 93, at
141 (comparing attorney mediators, whose focus is negotiating agreements about the
disputed issues, to nonlawyer mediators, whose focus is restructuring the family).
108. Fineman, supra note 82, at 765-66; see Shattuck, supra note 94, at 204 ("Joint legal
custody with its emphasis on shared decision making, is routinely ordered by the court
109. Fineman, supra note 82, at 730.
110. Bryan, supra note 84, at 491 (describing the models of mediation).
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agree to joint physical custody, the mediator might consider her
"unfriendly," or pathological.
Some of these reactions to mediation make sense only in light of
the mediation model against which the opponents railed. Mediation
takes many shapes,111 but the criticism assumed a model with fairly
consistent features. Many of these features drew on the California
experience, one of the first states to require mediation as a
prerequisite to litigating the custody issue. The following describes
the California model, at least when it first appeared in 1981.
In the first place, the model involved mandatory mediation. In
this model, the court ordered the parties to mediate, and it was
mandatory mediation that drew the most ire. Indeed, some of the
most vocal critics of mandatory mediation had no problems with
voluntary mediation, where there was less reason to worry about
power imbalances and mediator coercion."11 A legal penalty attached
to failing at least to attempt to reach agreement through mediation:
no access to the court to litigate the dispute.113
Just as troubling for the critics, this model of mediation excluded
lawyers. At one point in California, the mediation statute itself gave
the mediator the power to exclude lawyers from participating in the
mediation proceedings.'14 The mediator, with training in mental
health rather than law, focused the parties on reaching an agreement,
not on the law of custody, in which the mediator had no training.
Critics complained that without the law to set boundaries, this model
left the decision to the mediator's own personal biases."5 Indeed, this
model of mediation encouraged the mediator to recommend to the
parties how they ought to resolve their disagreements and to reorient
the parents about their post-separation parenting." 6 To accomplish
these goals, in the early days of mediation, it was common for the
mediator to meet with the child and advocate for the child in the
mediation session with the parents, who participated without
lawyers." 7
Excluding lawyers troubled the critics, especially in the setting of
domestic violence. At this stage of mandatory mediation, there was
not the consensus that later emerged that the process should screen
111. See BECK & SALES, supra note 24, at 9-16.
112. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 82, at 729.
113. Shattuck, supra note 94, at 199.
114. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607(a) (Deering 1981) (repealed 1994).
115. Teitelbaum & DuPaix, supra note 33, at 1125.
116. Shattuck, supra note 94, at 199.
117. Id.
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out victims of domestic violence.""8 Even so, mandatory mediation
critics complained that the law should not force spouses who suffered
abuse at home to mediate custody disputes with their abusers."9
Finally, the mediator performed the dual role of mediator and
evaluator, with the power to make recommendations to the court
when the mediation failed to result in an agreement. 121 With this dual
role, the mediator had a great deal of leverage: if a party failed to
agree to what the mediator appeared to prefer, the mediator could
hold it against the party as the mediator framed a recommendation to
the court. With this kind of power, a party would feel pressure to
"agree. ' ' 121 In California, the first state with mandatory mediation of
child custody, courts in most counties could require the mediators to
make recommendations. 122  Also, if the parties failed to reach an
agreement, the mediator could recommend an investigation or the
issuing of mutual restraining orders. 123 At any rate, what happened in
the mediation formed the basis for the mediator's recommendation,
which the judge usually followed, and mediators sometimes reminded
parties of their recommendation in order to force an agreement.
124
Even without this reminder, parents with any knowledge of human
behavior surely understood that if the mediator had suggested to the
parties what custody arrangement was best, that suggestion would
appear in the mediator's recommendation to the court.
118. For a description of programs in the 1990's that mediated in the presence of family
violence, see BECK & SALES, supra note 24, at 29. For the current trend towards
exempting parties from mandatory mediation because of domestic violence, see LAW OF
FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 50, § 2.01, at 171-72. Even so, commentators worry
that the screening in mediation and other settings is ineffective. See Ver Steegh, supra
note 37, at 1401-02.
119. Phyllis Gangel-Jacob, Some Words of Caution about Divorce Mediation, 23
HOFSTRA L. REV. 825, 884 (1995) (giving the perspective of a judge in New York on the
reasons why mandatory mediation posed threats to domestic violence victims); see also
BECK & SALES, supra note 24, at 31 ("Mediators, like everyone, are incapable of
identifying abusers' hidden signals; thus current screening procedures are useless for this
population of abused women.").
120. Shattuck, supra note 94, at 196 (noting that the practice of mediator as
recommender was not consistent even in California).
121. Contrast with the North Carolina model, supra notes 56-80 and accompanying
text.





IV. EMPIRICAL STUDIES COMPARING CUSTODY MEDIATION AND
LITIGATION
Since the dire predictions by the opponents of mandatory
mediation, researchers across disciplines have conducted hundreds of
studies related to family mediation, including custody mediation.
12 5
Even so, for the reasons explained below, the studies have given us
little insight into the effect of mandatory mediation on dividing
physical custody between mothers and fathers.126
In the first place, most of the studies involved voluntary
mediation. Some studies, for example, compared the experience of
couples who chose mediation to the experience of couples who chose
litigation. 27 As two prominent psychologists observed "couples who
self-select into a mediation-only option differ in substantial ways from
couples who self-select into a litigation-only option, which makes
obtaining matched samples of mediation and litigation samples nearly
impossible."'2 8  In one of the most famous longitudinal studies of
mediation and litigation of custody disputes, conducted by Jessica
Pearson and Nancy Thoennes, the researchers based their conclusions
on couples who chose to participate in the mediation.'29
125. For the concern that the studies lump multi-issue mediation with single issue
mediation, see infra note 158.
126. For the problems with empirical work in family law in general, see Margaret F.
Brinig, Empirical Work in Family Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1083.
127. See Jessica Pearson, The Equity of Mediated Divorce Agreements, 9 MEDIATION
Q. 179, 179-97 (1991). One important study involved only couples who had chosen
litigation. The couples then agreed to be randomly assigned either to mediation or
litigation. For reports of this study, see, e.g., Robert E. Emery & Melissa M. Wyer, A
Systematic Comparison of Child Custody Mediation and Litigation, FAIRSHARE, Feb.
1988, at 10 [hereinafter Emery & Wyer, A Systematic Comparison]; Robert E. Emery &
Melissa M. Wyer, Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: An Experimental Evaluation of
the Experience of Parents, 55 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 179 (1987). For the
longitudinal study based on these participants, see Robert E. Emery et al., Child Custody
Mediation and Litigation: Custody, Contact, and Coparenting 12 Years after Initial Dispute
Resolution, 69 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 323 (2001). For the book drawing on
this study, see ROBERT E. EMERY, THE TRUTH ABOUT CHILDREN AND DIVORCE
(2004).
128. BECK & SALES, supra note 24, at 165. Jessica Pearson has labeled as a "myth" the
conclusion that "[m]ediation cannot be effective unless participation is voluntary." Jessica
Pearson, Ten Myths about Family Law, 27 FAM. L.Q. 279, 286-88 (1993). While the
voluntary/involuntary nature may not affect its efficacy, it surely is relevant in comparing
the results on so crucial an issue as physical custody.
129. See Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation Research Results, in
DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 429 (Jay Folberg & Ann Milne eds.,
1988) (describing the Denver Custody Mediation Project); see also Joan B. Kelly, Lynn
Gigy & Sheryl Hausman, Mediated and Adversarial Divorce: Initial Findings from a
Longitudinal Study, in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 453 (Jay Folberg
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With that limitation in mind, the studies reported mixed results
on the comparison of physical custody as a result of mediation and
litigation. Some reported more joint legal custody in the mediation
group as compared to the litigation group but no differences in the
two groups in primary physical residence or number of days spent
with the noncustodial parent. Thus, although mediation appeared to
increase shared decisionmaking over important life decisions of the
child after divorce, it seemed not to increase the instances of shared
physical custody. 130 In another famous longitudinal study, on primary
residence, the mediating and litigating groups looked similar after the
passage of time, with most of the children residing with their
mothers."'
California adopted mandatory mediation early in the mediation
movement, so findings comparing mediated and litigated outcomes in
California offer evidence relating to the concerns of the feminist
scholars regarding mandatory mediation. In the most significant
study of custody in California, the prominent legal scholar, Robert
Mnookin, and the prominent psychologist, Eleanor Maccoby,
collaborated on a longitudinal study for data relating to gender and
parenting, legal conflict, children's contact with parents post-
separation, and the nature of post-separation co-parenting. To do
this, Maccoby and Mnookin studied about 2,000 families identified in
court records of divorce petitions in two California counties in the
mid-1980's. The study developed a cohort of persons who had
children who would remain minors for the length of the study. While
other studies tended to focus on white families in higher income
brackets, 3 2 Maccoby and Mnookin screened the families to reflect a
broader socioeconomic demographic. Research teams interviewed
the parents shortly after they had filed for divorce, usually within six
months after separation. Teams interviewed the subjects again one
year later, and for a third time, after about three and one-half years
after separation.'33 In 1992, the researchers published their findings in
& Ann Milne eds., 1988) (studying couples who voluntarily came to the mediation center
for mediation on all issues related to divorce).
130. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 129, at 445.
131. Emery et al., supra note 127, at 325 (involving parties assigned to mediate). While
this study found no difference in primary residence, it concluded that on other measures,
like parent-child contact, parenting quality, and coparenting conflict, mediation offered
significant benefits. Id. at 330-31.
132. See this criticism voiced in Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 95, at 484.




the monumental work, Dividing the Child: Social and Legal
Dilemmas of Custody.134
Among the authors' many analyses, Mnookin and Maccoby
examined the impact of the process on the physical custody outcome,
the primary focus of this Article. On physical custody, Mnookin and
Maccoby concluded that mandatory mediation resulted in higher
instances of joint physical custody, but only slightly,'35 confirming
only marginally what the feminist critique had predicted. However,
the authors confirmed other concerns, as they noted that mediators
were recommending joint physical and legal custody.3 6 Maccoby and
Mnookin worried, too, that joint physical custody emerged as a way
to resolve conflict rather than as a way to further the best interests of
the child, observing that cases that resolved right before trial revealed
disproportionately high percentages of joint physical custody.137 On a
positive note, however, the authors found that mandatory mediation
contributed to settling custody disputes. Overall, the authors
concluded "that mandatory mediation is a useful if imperfect means
for resolving legal conflict during divorce.""13
As for other claims of the benefits of mediation, many of the
other studies suffered from the same limitations, relying on samples
involving participants who volunteered to mediate and thus might not
reflect the experiences of participants whom the court ordered to
mediate. Using voluntary mediation models, some of the studies
reported that parents had higher levels of satisfaction with mediation
as opposed to litigation.139 Others compared voluntary, private
mediation with court-ordered mediation and reported higher
satisfaction for the private process. 4 ° In studies comparing men and
women, however, some of the studies supported the concerns of the
feminist critique of mediation. In particular, in several of these
comparisons, women reported higher levels of satisfaction with
134. MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 43.




139. Nina R. Meierding, Does Mediation Work? A Survey of Long-Term Satisfaction
and Durability Rates for Private Mediated Agreements, 11 MEDIATION Q. 157 (1993);
Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 129, at 437.
140. See Carol Bohmer & Marilyn L. Ray, Effects of Different Dispute Resolution
Methods on Women and Children After Divorce, 28 FAM. L.Q. 223, 244 (1994) (concluding
generally, however, that women and children are not worse off for mediating rather than
litigating under the Georgia mediation system).
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litigation than they did with mediation, 141 though certainly not
consistently. 142  Other studies suggested that women were more
satisfied with a voluntary mediation program in which they felt free to
terminate the session if they felt pressure,'143 a finding that would also
tend to justify the feminist critique.
Other findings in studies comparing voluntary mediation and
litigation found that mediation saved the parties some costs in
lawyers' fees if they mediated but that the state saved costs only with
mandatory mediation.'" Again, as other commentators pointed out,
one would expect parties inclined to mediate to need less lawyers'
time to resolve their disputes. 145
On the post-separation functioning of the family, the findings of
most of the studies did not support significant benefits from
mediation. In a study comparing mandatory mediation in one state
with litigation of custody in another state, the researchers reported
that mediation was "less damaging" for the relationship between the
parents.1 46 But whether the studies involved voluntary or mandatory
mediation, the findings suggested that after a passage of time, the
process used at separation seemed not to affect how well the parties
functioned after some time had elapsed since the actual dissolution of
the family.1 47 In one study involving voluntary, private mediation, the
researchers' main goal was to assess the difference in psychological
distress between a mediating and a litigating group. The private
mediation group was in a higher socioeconomic status than the
average divorcing couple and had more mediation sessions than the
141. Robert E. Emery & Joanne A. Jackson, The Charlottesville Mediation Project:
Mediated and Litigated Child Custody Disputes, 24 MEDIATION Q. 3, 12-14 (1989) (using a
cohort of parties assigned to mediate); DESMOND ELLIS & NOREEN STUCKLESS,
MEDIATING AND NEGOTIATING MARITAL CONFLICTS 96-97 (1996).
142. See Beck & Sales, supra note 19, at 1037-39 (contrasting studies that found very
different results regarding gender differences in reactions to mediation).
143. Id. at 1038-39.
144. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 129, at 447-48.
145. See Teitelbaum & DuPaix, supra note 33, at 1115 (arguing that the time-savings
resulted not from the process of mediating but rather from the characteristics of the
parties who chose voluntarily to mediate, since such parties tend to be more inclined to
resolve their differences). Pearson and Thoennes also claimed that the process of
voluntary mediation cut down the time the parties spent in resolving their custody
disputes. See Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 129, at 447 (describing the finding that
voluntary mediation takes less time than court-mandated as "not surprising").
146. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 129, at 443. On the limitations of the
comparison, see supra note 127 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., ELLIS & STUCKLESS, supra note 141, at 61 (finding no difference in




typical mandatory, court-annexed program. Still, the researchers did
not find mediation "to be significantly more effective overall in
reducing divorce related psychological distress than the adversarial
divorce process."'48 Rather, the decrease in distress in both groups
seemed to derive from the passage of time rather than from the
process.149 And, on what is surely the most important measure-the
adjustment of children-the findings did not support the superiority
of one process over another. As one of the most famous studies
concluded, "[O]ur findings suggest that the child's adjustment is more
a factor of family dynamics and overall environment than a result of
having parents who do not contest custody, mediate custody, or
pursue the issue through the courts." 5 ' Similarly, reporting on the
results of mandatory mediation, Robert Mnookin and Eleanor
Maccoby reported no evidence that the process helped "to create and
sustain a cooperative co-parental relationship." ''
Two important commentators on custody mediation, the
psychologist Connie J.A. Beck, and the J.D.-psychologist, Bruce D.
Sales, detailed a number of other problems with the empirical
research on family mediation in general, and custody mediation in
particular. 5 2 Noting a deficiency important for the data of this study,
Beck and Sales observed that the studies virtually ignored the impact
of lawyers in effecting settlements. In analyzing the studies, Beck and
Sales concluded that there was no investigation of the work of
lawyers involved in the disputes.'53 Because both lawyers and
mediators facilitated agreements, the failure to study lawyers
undermined the conclusions. 15 4
The research also suffered from not taking into account
differences in the relevant law. In another famous study comparing
mediation and litigation, the researchers compared the experience of
couples who had mediated in several states with couples who had
litigated in another state.'55 The research did not refer to the relevant
law of custody in any of the subject states. In fact, much of the
research in this area ignores that the parties may be mediating or
148. Kelly, Gigy & Hausman, supra note 129, at 472.
149. Id.
150. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 129, at 446.
151. MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 43, at 290.
152. See their article, Beck & Sales, supra note 19, and the book expanding on some of
their observations, BECK & SALES, supra note 24.
153. Beck & Sales, supra note 19, at 1044-46.
154. Id. at 1045-46.
155. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 129, at 430-32 (describing the Divorce Mediation
Research Project).
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litigating in the shadow of differing statutory or case law
presumptions that one would expect to affect the outcomes. 15 6
Beck and Sales cited other problems with the research. In nearly
all the studies, they found problems with "small sample sizes,
nonrandom samples and nonrandom assignment to dispute resolution
methods, nonequal comparison groups or more often no comparison
groups, confounding of dispute resolution process with issues
resolved by that process, few actual sessions recorded, and no
detailed, step-by-step manuals of the different models of mediation
used.'
1 57
Especially in the studies drawing comparisons between
mediation and litigation, the authors found that the researchers paid
little or no attention to the issues being mediated. 58 Sometimes the
mediation covered a variety of issues relating to the dissolution-
property and family support, as well as custody. For other families in
the study, the mediations may have involved only custody. 159 Lawyers
know that the dynamics vary dramatically depending on whether
settlement discussions involve a single issue or multiple issues. 16 In
sum, while researchers from a variety of fields have studied
mediation, they have not conclusively confirmed or dispelled the
feminist concerns about the effect of mandatory mediation on the
sharing of physical custody.
V. THE STUDY
A. The Parameters of the Study
With the limitations of the other studies in mind, we chose not to
devise a random sample with the purpose of proving a causal
relationship between factors. Instead, we examined an entire
population of people involved in custody disputes in a mandatory
mediation jurisdiction to describe outcomes in custody.
We drew the population from the Twenty-First Judicial District
of North Carolina, which is comprised of Forsyth County. In many
156. For the famous law review article from which the phrase is borrowed, see Robert
H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). Even though we may wonder how much attention
parents embroiled in custody disputes pay to the law-see, e.g., Brinig, supra note 126, at
1096-97-law surely plays a role when parents litigate custody disputes.
157. Beck & Sales, supra note 19, at 1044.
158. Id. at 1034-35.
159. Id. at 1034.
160. See infra Table 9 and note 194.
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ways, Forsyth County is typical of North Carolina as a whole. It is
both urban and rural. The county's estimated 2005 population was
325,967, representing a 6.5% increase from the 2000 census
population of 306,067.161 The county seat of Winston-Salem, with a
2000 population of 185,776, ranks as one of the five largest cities in
the state.162 The 2003 median household income for Forsyth County
was $41,239, slightly higher than the statewide median of $39,438.163
The average number of persons per household was 2.39, somewhat
less than the statewide average of 2.49."6 According to the 2000
census, whites accounted for 71.3% of the county's population, and
blacks accounted for 25.9% of the county's population. The
corresponding percentages for the state as a whole were 74.1% and
21.8%, respectively.165 As of 2000, the percentage of persons age 25
or older in Forsyth County who were high school graduates was 82%,
compared to a statewide percentage of 78.1%.166
We defined the population as everyone in the twenty-first
judicial district who was involved with the court in a custody dispute
in 2002. We defined "involved with the court" as one of the following
occurring in 2002:
1. filing an action raising a claim for custody,
2. being referred to court-ordered custody mediation,
3. resolving a custody dispute through a parenting agreement
in court-ordered mediation,
4. resolving a custody dispute by lawyer-negotiated settlement
in a document filed with the court,167 or
5. resolving a dispute by litigation resulting in a custody order.
If any of these five events occurred in 2002, we included the
persons so involved in the study.
To find. all the subjects of the study, we used the records of the
North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts and of the court
161. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, State and County Quick Facts,
Forsyth County, North Carolina, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/37/37067.html (last
visited Aug. 27, 2007).
162. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COUNTY AND CITY
DATABOOK: 2000, at 854, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/OOccdb/
ccOO tabCl.pdf.




167. We did not include parties whose only filing in 2002 was a separation agreement
incorporated by reference in a divorce judgment. If that were the only filing in 2002, those
persons were not "involved with the court" within the meaning of this study.
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personnel of the Forsyth County District Court. From the
administrative office of the courts, we compiled a list of all filers of
actions in 2002 in the twenty-first judicial district in which one of the
parties raised a claim for custody. To get to all the other categories,
we enlisted the court personnel of the Forsyth County District Court.
From the records of the court mediator, we identified the names of all
persons in the twenty-first judicial district referred to custody
mediation in 2002 and all persons in the twenty-first judicial district
for whom a referral resulted in a mediated custody settlement, or
parenting agreement. 168 From the calendar records of the assistant .to
the chief district court judge, we identified all persons involved in
custody hearings in 2002 in the twenty-first judicial district. Many of
these "hearings" involved a judge merely signing a document in which
the parties had consented to some arrangement relating to custody.169
Other hearings involved the litigation of a custody dispute, resulting
not in a consent document but rather in a formal custody order.
These records enabled us to identify all the custody resolution
events for our population. We defined a custody resolution event as
one concluded by settlement or litigation. We further distinguished
between court-mediated settlements that involved a parenting
agreement, labeled "mediation" in this study, and other types of
consent filings. Those consent filings, reached outside mediation,
usually resulted through lawyer-negotiated settlements; therefore, in
this study we labeled these other consent filings "settlement." The
third type of custody resolution event, one concluded by court order,
we labeled "litigation." 7 '
After we compiled the list of persons involved with custody in
the twenty-first judicial district in 2002, we collected all the
information about those persons relating to custody for a relevant
time period. We decided on an eight-year period, from 1997 through
2005. Because of how mandatory custody mediation operates, 7' we
needed to capture several years before 2002, the year defining the
population. For the people who resolved their custody disputes in
2002 by settlement or by litigation, the court had previously ordered
168. For the statutory definition of mediated custody settlement as a parenting
agreement, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1(h) (2005); supra text accompanying note 75.
169. We recognize that we might have missed cases settled in 2002 and filed without a
hearing. The court administrators believed, however, that all of the cases would have
appeared on the court calendars for 2002 even if they were settled without a hearing.
170. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 56-80 and accompanying text.
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most of them to mediate. 7 2 Collecting information on our population
prior to 2002 usually revealed that this population had experience
with court-ordered mediation.7  We chose 1997 because Forsyth
County began to implement mandatory mediation in 1995, with cases
routinely referred to mediation at least by 1997.
We also wanted to capture several years after 2002. Since we
had chosen 2002 as the year defining the population, we collected
custody information through 2005 so that the part of the population
just entering the court system in 2002 would have had time to resolve
some issue relating to custody.
By confining the study to a relatively short time period, we
avoided problems reflected in some of the other studies. In a
confined period, the model of mediation used by the mandatory
program had not varied. 74 Moreover, we picked a time period in
which the law of custody had not changed in any way that would
affect the conduct of either the lawyers or the judges involved in the
custody disputes. On the other hand, the study suffers from the
problem common to many empirical studies in family law-namely,
that it was restricted to a population with its own idiosyncrasies. 75
For example, despite statewide rules, the practices of lawyers and
judges in Forsyth County differ from the practices of lawyers and
judges in other parts of the state, and perhaps even more so in other
parts of the country. Also, we confined our study to the information
in the court records. Depending on the issues between the parties in
the population, some records contained significant information about
172. See infra Table 10. In North Carolina, while the court orders the parties to
mediate, they can proceed to litigate after attending one private mediation session. See
supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. Moreover, few penalties attach to failing to
mediate. Id.; see also infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text (noting that while the
local rules of Forsyth County authorize contempt, in practice, the court usually orders the
parties back to negotiation). Finally, the court may exempt parties from mediation for
good cause. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
173. In another way our data established that the parties who resolved their disputes
through settlements and litigation had probably been already involved in mediation. The
average length of time between the first filing and the first custody resolution event was
112 days for parties who resolved their dispute by mediation. For parties whose first
custody resolution event was a settlement, the average length of time was longer-167
days. For parties whose first custody resolution event was litigation, the average length of
time was the longest-204 days. These findings reflect that most members of the
population involved in this study made their way through the mediation process and then
either to a negotiated settlement or litigation.
174. In fact, only several mediators were involved in all of the mediations for the
period covered by the study. See infra note 195.
175. See Brinig, supra note 126, at 1095 (warning about generalizing across
populations).
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incomes and other matters while other records did not. Finally, and
perhaps most significantly, our population reflects families in real
conflict about custody. According to some studies, about one-half of
divorcing couples resolve issues about custody with no interventions
from the court or other process.176 Another 30% of divorcing couples
resolve their custody conflicts shortly after filing something with the
court.177 Our population reflects people who are in more serious
conflict about custody and excludes all those people who were able to
work the issues out for themselves. Since most of the people in our
population hired lawyers, 178 the population probably also excludes
people with very low incomes. Since people with high income may
resolve their custody disputes through private mediators, people at
high income levels may also be absent from our population. Despite
these limitations, some of which are simply endemic to empirical
work in family law, 179 the results nevertheless told a story.
With data collection forms on their laptops, students from Wake
Forest Law School extracted information from the records in the
court files on this population. They gathered all information
available about both parties, the children, the allegations the parties
made against each other, and the findings reflected in custody
resolution events, whether through mediation, settlements, or
litigation. If the parties mediated, we searched for information about
the sessions. If the mediation resulted in a parenting agreement, the
agreement reached in court-ordered mediation,18° the students
recorded the terms to which the parties agreed. On the other hand, if
the parties failed to reach a parenting agreement, the students looked
for indications from the court documents explaining the failure to
agree.
The students recorded the terms of every custody resolution
event in the file. The collection form defined custody resolution
events as "file documents relating to custody and/or child support,
including parenting agreements, consent orders, memoranda of
agreement, court orders and temporary custody orders, as well as
court rulings on motions to modify or enforce." Similarly, the
students recorded everything about the custody resolution events:
the division of physical custody, provisions for legal custody, and
176. MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 43, at 13 7.
177. Id. at 138 (finding that "about 30 percent of ... [their] sample ... were also
resolved without the need for mediation, evaluation, or trial").
178. See infra Part V(B).
179. Brinig, supra note 126, at 1084.
180. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1(h) (2005).
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terms and conditions of visitation. They also noted information on
the lawyers involved.
We developed a code book to standardize the data collected by
the students and coded almost all of the information that they
collected. In particular, for the custody resolution events, we coded
all of the information on the parties' first custody resolution event
and all changes to the terms resolved by the initial event in
subsequent resolution events. As noted above, the court files had
some data for some parties and not for others. In the following report
of the findings, therefore, some of the totals in the tables differ,
reflecting that data was not available for some of the categories. We
followed standard methodology to report the data as available, and a
number of the findings were statistically significant.
B. Findings: The Parties and Their Lawyers
As one would expect, child custody conflicts usually involve
disputing parents.' The sum of 426 cases reflected the total
population, and of these cases, either the mother or father was the
plaintiff in 407 of them, or 95.5%. In 13 of the 19 cases in which the
plaintiff was someone else, the plaintiff was a grandparent. The
defendant was either the mother or the father in 415 cases (97.6%).
The dominant pattern, then, involved one parent suing the other
parent (Table 1).
Table 1: Identity of plaintiffs and defendants (all cases)
Plaintiffs and defendants
Plaintiff Percentage Defendant Percentage
Mother 246 57.7% 165 38.8%
Father 161 37.8% 250 58.8%
Grandparent(s) 13 3.0% 2 .5%
Other 6 1.4% 8 1.9%
Total 426 99.9% 425* 100%
*One file did not identify the defendant.
181. The study involved child custody disputes related to family dissolution, regulated
in North Carolina under Chapter 50 of the General Statutes of North Carolina. N.C. GEN.
STAT. ch. 50, art. 1 (2005 & Supp. 2006). When the state seeks protective custody because
of allegations of abuse and neglect, the state is a party to the proceedings under Chapter
7B of the General Statutes of North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 7B, arts. 1-14 (2005 &
Supp. 2006). This study excluded proceedings under Chapter 7B, however.
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Table 1 also shows that the plaintiff was more likely to be the
mother (246/426, 57.7%) than the father (161/426, 37.8%). Likewise,
the defendant was more often the father (250/425, 58.8%) than the
mother (165/425, 38.8%).182
As indicated in the introduction, this study is unusual because of
the high number of represented parties. 18 3 Forsyth County does not
have a family court, where pro se appearances are more common, and
as reflected in Table 2, the plaintiffs usually had counsel (413/424,
97.4%). Although representation occasionally changed, most
plaintiffs were represented by the same lawyer throughout their cases
(326/397, 82.1%). These percentages are surprising not only because
of the national experience on declining representation in family law
cases, but also because of the data we collected on the income level of
plaintiffs. We collected income data in the files in which it appeared,
usually because the parties had disputed child support. When child
support was in issue, the files contained affidavits from which we
could determine income. In 279 of the cases, however, there was
nothing on income. Although data was available only in 147 of the
cases, the median annual income of the plaintiffs for whom we had
this information was $26,000; the mean, $31,556.59.1'
As reflected in Table 2, defendants were less often represented
by counsel, although the percentage was still quite high (294/405,
72.6%). Like the plaintiffs, defendants tended to retain their initial
lawyer (197/268, 73.5%). The median annual income of the
defendants for whom we found information was $30,000; the mean,
$39,962.07 (n=144), an amount similar but slightly higher than that
reported for plaintiffs. 8 5  Women were more often plaintiffs,
however, and with women's income statistically lower than men's, the
higher income for defendants was not surprising.
182. In some of the cases, only one of the parents was either the plaintiff or defendant.
In 405 of the 426 cases (95%), however, the dispute pitted one parent against the other.
183. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
184. Because a few instances of extremely high or low income may skew the mean, the
median may be a more useful number in these cases.
185. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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Table 2: Representation by counsel
Representation _Plaintiffs and defendants
Plaintiff Percentage Defendant Percentage
Represented
by 413/424 97.4% 294/405 72.6%
counsel
Represented
by 326/397 82.1% 197/268 73.5%
same counsel
We have a picture, then, of plaintiffs and defendants of modest
means who nonetheless almost always find the money to retain
counsel.
C. The Children and the Family
Rarely were more than two children the subject of a custody
dispute. Almost two-thirds of the cases involved only one child
(277/425, 65.2%). Two children were involved in most of the rest of
the cases (117/425, 27.5%). Less than 10% of the cases involved more
than two children (31/425, 7.3%). As national studies have found,
most of the custody disputes involve young children. The average age
of the oldest child, or the only child in cases involving just one child,
was just under 7 years at the time of the first custody resolution event.
The average age of the second child was 2 years 7 months.
Our data show a rather traditional picture of the family. In cases
in which we could determine a primary caregiver before the custody
dispute, that person was usually the mother (223/313, 71.2%). The
father provided primary care only 7.7% of the time (24/313). In
another 42 cases, the parties disputed who had been primary
caregiver (42/313, 13.4%). The records did not always indicate
whether the parents involved in the dispute had ever been married.
When they did, they revealed that the children in the study had
parents who were or had been married (296/409, 72.4%).' The
parents had been married, on average, 8.7 years at the time of their
separation, with a median of 8.0 years (n=231).
186. For information on nonmarital families, see The Fragile Familes and Child
Wellbeing Study of the Bendheim-Thoman Center for Research on Child Wellbeing,
http://www.fragilefamiles.princeton.edu (last visited Aug. 26, 2007).
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D. Type of Custody Sought
To the extent that the mother as primary caregiver reflects the
traditional family, the traditional family emerged also in the custody
the parents sought. We distinguished among three kinds of requests:
(1) primary physical custody (regardless of the type of legal custody);
(2) joint physical custody187 (regardless of type of legal custody); and
(3) visitation only. The results are set forth below:
Table 3: Type of custody sought by plaintiffs
Type of By gender
custody All Percen- Mothers Percen- Fathers Percen-
Cases tage tage tage
Primary
physical 351 90.7% 222/224 99.1% 111/144 77%
custody
Joint
physical 23 5.9% 1/224 .4% 22/144 15.3%
custody
Visitation 10 2.6% 1/224 .4% 9/144 6.3%
only
Other 3 .8% 0 0 2/144 1.4%
Total 387 100% 224 99.9% 144 100%
We were able to determine the specific type of custody sought in
387 of the cases. In 351 of those cases (90.7%), the plaintiff sought
primary physical custody. The complaints reflected that the plaintiff
sought joint physical custody in 5.9% of the cases (23/387), visitation
only in 2.6% (10/387), and something else in only 3 of the cases (.8%).
The breakdown between mothers and fathers also reflected the
traditional roles. When the mother was the plaintiff, we could
determine the specific type of custody sought in 224 cases. Of those,
the mother sought primary physical custody in 222 of them (99.1%).
Fathers also usually sought primary physical custody when they were
plaintiffs, but were less likely than mothers to do so. When the father
was plaintiff, we could determine the specific type of custody sought
187. For other parts of the study, we defined joint physical custody. See infra note 188.




in 144 cases. Of those, the father sought primary custody in 111 of the
cases (77%).
Mothers almost never sought joint physical custody or visitation
only (2/224). When plaintiffs sought either joint physical custody or
visitation only, the plaintiffs were almost always fathers (22/23, 9/10).
E. Custody Outcome
Of all custody outcomes involving mother and father, primary
physical custody to mother was the most common. Of the custody
resolution events awarding physical custody either to mother or
father or jointly, the mother received primary physical custody in
71.9% of the cases (235/327). The father received primary physical
custody in 12.8% of the cases (42/327). Joint physical custody,
defined for the study as one involving at least 123 overnights,188
resulted in 15.3% of the cases (50/327).
When either the mother or father as plaintiff sought primary
physical custody, the plaintiff usually got it (182/264, 68.9%) (Table
4).189 It made a difference, however, if the plaintiff was the mother. If
the plaintiff was the mother and sought primary physical custody, she
got it in 81.5% of the cases (145/178). If the plaintiff was the father
and sought physical custody, he received it in 33.7% of the cases
(29/86). The difference was statistically significant (p<.001).
When the plaintiff sought primary physical custody, the
arrangement reflected in the custody resolution event was rarely joint
physical custody-only in 16.7% of the cases (44/264) (Table 4). If
the mother sought primary physical custody, the arrangement was
188. As explained in the background, supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text, many
terms relating to child custody are undefined, including "joint physical custody," which has
no commonly-accepted definition. But cf Patterson v. Taylor, 140 N.C. App. 91, 95, 535
S.E.2d 374, 377 (2000) (noting that "the bench and bar have proven adept at distinguishing
in practice between physical and legal custody" but urging more precision in the use of the
terms in "fashioning orders and agreements" to avoid "later confusion and obviate
litigation"). In North Carolina, the child support guidelines offer an indirect way to define
joint physical custody as custody in which each parent has physical custody of the child for
at least 123 nights during the year. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, NORTH
CAROLINA CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES, AOC-A-162, Rev. 10/06, at 5, available at
http://www.nccourts.org/Forms/Documents/981.pdf (instructing the parties to use a
different worksheet to calculate the amount of child support once the child spends 123
overnights with each parent). We borrowed the measure of 123 overnights from the child
support guidelines as the measure for joint physical custody in this study.
189. See Margaret F. Brinig & D.W. Allen, "These Boots Are Made for Walking": Why
Most Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 AM. L. ECON. REV. 126, 136-37, 154-58 (2000)
(suggesting that custody partly explains why in so many divorces the women bring the
action).
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joint physical custody in only 13.5% of the cases (24/178). If the
father sought primary physical custody, the arrangement was joint
physical custody in 23.3% of the cases (20/86). Again, the difference
was statistically significant (p<.001).
Table 4: Custody outcome when plaintiffs
seek primary physical custody
Who Award of custody
was Mother Father Joint
plaintiff? primary primary physicalTotal
Mother 145 81.5% 9 5.1% 24 13.5% 178
Father 37 43% 29 33.7% 20 23.3% 86
Total 182 68.9% 38 14.4% 44 16.7% 264
x' = 48.850; df = 2; p<.001; v = .430.
F. Custody Outcome by Process
We were particularly interested in determining what kind of
custody resolution events emerged from which process: mediation,
other settlement, or litigation.19 Custody resolution events in those
three categories occurred in 360 cases. Of those cases, 85, or 23.6%,
came from mediation; 130, or 36.1%, from other settlements; and 145,
or 40.3%, from litigation. When we confined the events to those
cases with physical custody either to mother, father, or jointly, the
numbers reveal 25.7% from mediation (83/323), 36.5% from
settlement (118/323), and 37.8% from litigation (122/323) (Table 5).191
Of those, the most typical custody result was primary physical custody
to the mother (232/323, 71.8%). The father received primary physical
custody in 12.7% of the cases (41/323), with joint physical custody in
15.5% of the cases (50/323).
When we correlated the process for the custody resolution events
with the outcomes, we discovered the most surprising of our findings:
mothers received primary custody more often i-f mediation than they
190. If the first custody resolution event appeared as a parenting agreement, we
classified it as mediation; if it appeared in some other kind of consent filing, which was
almost always a lawyer-negotiated settlement, we classified it as a settlement; and if it
appeared by court decree, we classified it as litigation. See supra notes 166-68 and
accompanying text.
191. This comparison involved fewer numbers because it excluded awards of custody to




did either in lawyer-negotiated settlements or in litigation. The
difference was statistically significant (p<.05).
In mediation, mothers received primary physical custody 83.1%
of the time (69/83), the setting that we once thought would lead to
mother custody the least of all the settings. In lawyer-negotiated
settlements, mothers received primary physical custody in 69.5% of
the cases (82/118); and in litigation, mother-custody emerged in
66.4% of the cases (81/122). Fathers, on the other hand, received
primary physical custody most often in litigation-in 18.9% of the
cases (23/122)-and received primary physical custody least often in
mediation (5/83, 6%), compared to 11% in other settlements (13/118).
A second prediction of opponents of mandatory mediation
warned that mediators would promote joint physical custody and that
equal sharing of physical custody would become the norm. Of the
joint physical custody awards in our study, most of them appeared in
other settlements (23/50, 46%). The fewest joint physical awards
emerged from mediation (9/50, 18%), with the remainder from
litigation (18/50, 36%). There was a statistically significant difference
in custody outcome by process (p<.05).
Table 5: Custody outcome by process
Type of custody resolution event
Outcome Media- Settle- % Litiga- % Total
tion ment tion
Mother 69 29.7% 82 35.3% 81 34.9% 232primary
Father 5 12.2% 13 31.7% 23 56.1% 41
primary
Jointpyica 9 18% 23 46% 18 36% 50physical
Total 83 25.7% 118 36.5% 122 37.8% 323
x' = 11.305; df = 4; p<.05; v = .132.
In looking for explanations for these results, we tried to isolate
factors that seemed to make a difference. In the first place, mothers
were represented. Out of the 407 cases involving mothers as either
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plaintiffs or defendants, mothers had lawyers in 355 of them (87.2%).
Fathers were represented slightly less often (331/405, 81.7%). Our
study did not involve the mediation model that worried the critics of
mandatory mediation, one in which mothers would face a power
imbalance without someone to give her advice about what the law of
custody provided.192 Based on these numbers, one possible inference
is that involving lawyers in the mediation process tends to decrease
the number of mothers who feel constrained to agree to joint physical
custody.
More analysis on the presence of lawyers, however, led to
another interesting finding (Table 6). We wanted to determine if the
presence of lawyers made a difference in reaching a custody
resolution event. Because almost all the plaintiffs in our study had
lawyers, the analysis of the representation of plaintiffs did not reveal
much. But the analysis of when the defendants also had lawyers
revealed that in that case, there was a higher percentage of cases with
a custody resolution event. We could determine whether the
defendants had lawyers in 380 cases in which we also determined
whether the parties reached a custody resolution event. The parties
reached custody resolution events overall 90.3% of the time
(343/380). But when the defendants had lawyers, they reached
custody resolution events 91.5% of the time (248/271) and 87.2% of
the time (95/109) when they did not. Likewise, the parties failed to
reach a custody resolution event 9.7% of the time (37/380). But when
the defendants had lawyers, the parties failed to reach custody
resolution events only 8.5% of the time (23/271), compared to 12.8%
of the time when they did not (14/109). The finding was interesting,
though not statistically significant.
192. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
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Table 6: Custody resolution event (CRE)
and defendant representation
Was Whether the parties reached a custody resolution
defendant event
represented? No CRE % CRE % Total
Represented 23 8.5% 248 91.5% 271
Notret 14 12.8% 95 87.2% 109represented
Total 9.7% 90.3% 380
ns ns
ns = not significant
Not only did lawyers seem to affect whether there was a custody
resolution event, but they also appeared to affect the type of custody
resolution event (Table 7). The difference was statistically significant
(p<.05). If the defendant was not represented, more of the custody
resolution events concluded by litigation (42/89, 47.2%). The rest
were fairly evenly divided between mediation (26/89, 29.2%) and
other settlement (21/89, 23.6%). When there were lawyers for both
the plaintiff and defendant, however, the numbers shifted. With two
lawyers, 40% of the cases concluded by a settlement (96/240). The
percentage of litigated cases dropped from 47.2% to 36.7% (88/240),
while the mediated cases declined from 29.2% to 23.3% (56/240).
Table 7: Type of custody resolution event
and defendant representation
Was Type of custody resolution event
defendant Media- Settle- Litiga-
represented? tion ment tion % Total
Represented 56 23.3% 96 40% 88 36.7% 240
Notret 26 29.2% 21 23.6% 42 47.2% 89represented
Total 82 24.9% 117 35.6% 130 39.5% 329
x2 = 7.634; df = 2; p<.05; v = .152.
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Besides representation, another factor that seemed to make a
difference on the type of custody resolution event was whether the
mother had been the primary caregiver. As reflected in Table 8, we
knew whether the mother had been the primary caregiver in 271 of
the cases in which custody was resolved by either mediation,
settlement, or litigation. When the mother had been the primary
caregiver, the percentages reflected the overall breakdown of custody
resolution events: 26% by mediation (51/196), 35.7% by settlement
(70/196), and 38.3% by litigation (75/196). When the mother had not
been the primary caregiver, however, those numbers shifted from
mediation and settlement to litigation. If the mother had not been
the primary caregiver, only 20% of the resolutions were by mediation
(15/75) and 28% by other settlement (21/75), while 52% ended by
litigation (39/75). These results suggest that the parties saw more
doubt in the ultimate resolution of custody when the mother had not
been the primary caregiver and were willing to take some chances in
litigation. On the other hand, when the mother had provided primary
care, the results suggested that the parties assumed that the ultimate
resolution would favor the mother and settled the custody dispute
rather than pursuing it through litigation.
Table 8: Type of custody resolution event if
mother had been primary caregiver
Mother as Type of custody resolution event
caregiver Media- Settle- % Litiga- % Total
tion ment tion
Primary 51 26% 70 35.7% 75 38.3% 196
Notpia 15 20% 21 28% 39 52% 75primary
Ttl66 91 114
Total 24.4% 33.6% 42.1% 271
ns ns ns
ns = not significant
The presence of multiple issues also seemed to have an impact
on the type of custody resolution event. We looked at whether
custody alone was in issue and compared it to cases in which the
parties disputed custody and some other issue-like child support or
property division, for example. As reflected in Table 9, if only
custody was in issue, the parties were less likely to resolve it by
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agreement, either through mediation or other settlement. Multiple
issues increased the likelihood of settlement in one form or another.
With only custody in issue, the custody resolution event ended by
mediation in only 10.4% of the cases (8/77). If custody and another
issue were involved, the custody resolution event ended by mediation
in 25.8% of the cases (62/240). If custody and no other issue were
involved, the custody resolution event concluded by litigation in
53.2% of the cases (41/77). If multiple issues were involved, the
parties concluded custody by litigation in only 36.7% of the cases
(88/240). The parties settled the custody issue by other settlement in
36.4% of the cases when only custody was involved (28/77), compared
to 37.5% when custody and another issue were involved (90/240).
The result is particularly interesting for a state like North Carolina, in
which the child custody mediator does not address economic issues."'
But as many negotiation and mediation theorists believe,1 94 having
multiple issues in dispute makes reaching agreement more likely since
there are more opportunities for favorable trades between the parties.
The results of this study suggest that this phenomenon may affect
custody disputes as well.
Table 9: Type of custody resolution event and custody
alone or custody plus other issues
No. of Type of custody resolution event
issues Media- Settle- % Litiga- % Total
tion ment tion
Custody 8 10.4% 28 36.4% 41 53.2% 77
alone
Custody
andote 62 25.8% 90 37.5% 88 36.7% 240other
issues
70 11812
Total 22.1% 37.2% 129 40.7% 317
ns ns ns
ns = not significant
193. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1(b) (2005) (providing that the court may not refer
economic issues to the custody mediator); see also UNIFORM RULES, supra note 17, at 8
(restricting the mediation to non-economic issues).
194. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES 68-76 (2d ed. 1991);
RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 130 (2002).
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We also looked at the data to determine if mediation appeared
to encourage some kind of custody resolution event (Table 10). It
did. If the parties attended a mediation session, a custody resolution
event occurred in 70.5% of the cases (220/312). If they did not, a
custody resolution event occurred in only 29.5% of the cases (92/312).
Moreover, the numbers of cases resolved through litigation
significantly increased if the parties did not mediate. If the parties
mediated, only 38.2% of the custody resolution events occurred
through litigation (84/220). If the parties did not mediate, 50% of the
custody resolution events occurred in litigation (46/92). There was a
statistically significant difference in the type of custody resolution
event based on whether mediation was held or not (p<.01).
Table 10: Whether mediation held and
type of custody resolution event
Was Type of custody resolution event
mediation Media- Settle- Litiga-
held? tion % ment % tion % Total
Mediation 67 30.5% 69 31.4% 84 38.2% 220
held
Mediation 9 9.8% 37 40.2% 46 50% 92
not held
Total 76 24.4% 106 34% 130 41.7% 312
x = 15.052; df = 2; p<.01; v = .220.
Finally, we analyzed whether parenting agreements looked any
different from other custody resolution events on the issue of joint
legal, as opposed to joint physical, custody (Table 11). They did, and
the difference was statistically significant (p<.001). Out of the total
custody resolution events by mediation, other settlement, or
litigation, joint legal custody appeared in 69.7% of them (175/251).
But when we analyzed the type of custody resolution event in which
joint legal custody appeared, we discovered joint legal custody in
90.5% of parenting agreements (67/74). In other settlements, joint
legal custody appeared 71.6% of the time (63/88). In litigation, joint
legal custody appeared the fewest number of times, in only 50.6% of
the cases (45/89). Our numbers provide some support for what the
critics suspected: that certain terms on joint custody become standard
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in mediated agreements. 95 In our data, however, the standard term-
joint legal custody-promoted joint decisionmaking rather than the
sharing of physical custody.
Table 11: Joint legal custody and type of custody resolution event
Was Type of custody resolution event
there
joint legal Media- % Settle- % Litiga- % Total
custody? tion ment tion
Joint
legal 67 38.3% 63 36% 45 25.7% 175
custody
Not joint
legal 7 9.2% 25 32.9% 44 57.9% 76
custody II
Total 74 29.5% 88 35.1% 89 35.5% 251
x' = 30.815; df = 2; p<.001; v .350.
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY
In light of the history of dispute resolution and custody, some of
the more surprising findings of this study relate to the incidence of
primary physical custody in relation to mandatory mediation.
Contrary to what had once been conventional wisdom, mandatory
mediation did not appear to lead to increased sharing of physical
custody. Before we suggest any explanations, we acknowledge the
dangers of drawing conclusions from a population with its own
idiosyncrasies. As Margaret Brinig has cautioned us, we act at our
peril if we rely on empirical results from one part of a state to draft
policy for the entire state, or even worse, for another state or
region.19 6 Some of these findings, however, parallel findings from
across the nation, giving us confidence in drawing at least some
195. This result is not surprising in light of the operation of court-ordered custody
mediation. For example, in North Carolina, one mediator serves the entire judicial
district. Existing Programs, supra note 6 (reporting that for the thirty judicial districts in
which mandatory mediation has been implemented, thirty mediators serve all the
districts). In Forsyth County, our study involved only two mediators for the entire eight-
year period of the study. One would expect similar terms to appear in agreements
facilitated by the same mediator.
196. Brinig, supra note 126, at 1085.
2007] 1675
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
preliminary conclusions. As explained below, at a minimum, the
findings raise questions that warrant further study on some of the
influences on the sharing of physical custody, some of the influences
on mandatory mediation, and some of the implications for the future
of mandatory mediation.
A. Influences on the Sharing of Physical Custody
Our study suggests that critics were wrong in supposing that
mandatory mediation would lead to widespread, routine
arrangements of joint physical custody. At the time of the criticism,
the momentum for joint physical custody had gained steam, and
critics worried that mandatory mediation would only accelerate the
trend, regardless of the merits of shared physical custody in a
particular case. In some ways, however, forces coalesced to slow the
momentum favoring joint physical custody.
For one, researchers released more nuanced findings about the
effect of divorce on children. While studies in the early 1980's
reported about the devastating effects of divorce, subsequent studies
warned about the devastating effects of conflict. For those marriages
characterized by high conflict, children fared better after divorce. For
children of marriages with low to moderate conflict, divorce
continued to cause lingering psychological problems. 97
By emphasizing the central role of conflict, the later research
gave some support to people opposed to doctrines that presumed that
joint physical custody favored the best interests of the child. t9 If joint
physical custody led to more conflict, then parents should not agree to
it. If mediators, judges, or the parties reached joint physical custody
197. See PAUL R. AMATO & ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING UP
IN AN ERA OF FAMILY UPHEAVAL 238 (1997) (cautioning parents to stay together in "less
than satisfactory" marriages); Christy M. Buchanan, Eleanor E. Maccoby & Sanford M.
Dornbusch, Caught Between Parents: Adolescents' Experience in Divorced Homes, 62
CHILD DEV. 1008 (1991); see also JUDITH WALLERSTEIN, JULIA LEWIS & SANDRA
BLAKESLEE, THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE: A 25 YEAR LANDMARK STUDY
297-301 (2000) (drawing more somber conclusions); E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON & JOHN
KELLY, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DIVORCE RECONSIDERED 208 (2002) (noting
adverse risks for children of divorce).
198. See, e.g., MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 43, at 284-85 (rejecting a
presumption of joint custody); see also Margaret Martin Barry, The District of Columbia's
Joint Custody Presumption: Misplaced Blame and Simplistic Solutions, 46 CATH. U. L.
REV. 767, 821 (1997) (rejecting a presumption of joint custody). More recently, after
intense efforts, courts are reluctantly recognizing the significance of domestic violence in
determining custody and visitation. See, e.g., Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child
Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the
Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 657, 667-98 (2003).
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as a compromise for cases of high conflict, then children suffered. 99
As critics began to point out, "conflict localized around the time of
litigation and divorce is less harmful than conflict [that] remains an
intrinsic and unresolved part of the parents' relationship and
continues after their divorce."2"
In place of presumptions for joint physical custody,
commentators began to promote the approximation rule. First
proposed by Elizabeth Scott,20 this rule divides post-separation
physical custody in proportion to the time that the parent spent
performing caretaking functions with the child before divorce.
Related both to primary caregiving and shared parenting, °2 the rule
recognizes that parents in modern households often share caregiving
responsibilities. Instead of one spouse or the other receiving primary
caregiver status after separation, the approximation rule honors the
realities of dual career families by recognizing shared custody but
only in proportion to the pre-separation experience of the parents
and child. The American Law Institute adopted the rule in its
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and
Recommendations,23 and it has received significant support. While
offering something concrete for the indeterminate best interests
standard, the approximation rule acknowledges both the importance
199. MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 43, at 285. This study also suggests that
courts may use joint physical custody as a compromise in high conflict cases. As noted
supra notes 172-73, most of the parties in this study who litigated custody had already
tried and failed to mediate their disputes. Moreover, the custody conflicts of parties in this
study who had litigated custody had continued for the longest periods of time. See supra
note 173. Nevertheless, 36% of the joint physical custody outcomes occurred in litigation.
Supra Table 5. For parties with this serious level of conflict, one might question the
propriety of joint physical custody.
200. Michael E. Lamb, Placing Children's Interests First: Developmentally Appropriate
Parenting Plans, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 98, 105-06 (2002).
201. Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preferences and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L.
REV. 615,617 (1992).
202. With the primary caregiver presumption, the judge makes findings on which
parent, if either, performed most of the caregiving functions. If there was a primary
caregiver, the court awards primary custody to that parent, visitation to the other. The
approximation rule allocates time between the two based on time spent, without requiring
the court to label one parent or the other as primary. See generally LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION, supra note 51, § 2.08, at 210-15 (describing the use of the approximation
rule and variations of the rule).
203. Id. at § 2.08. For an explanation of the rule by the reporter for the custody
chapter, see Bartlett, supra note 89, at 5. See also Robert F. Kelly & Shawn L. Ward,
Allocating Custodial Responsibilities at Divorce: Social Science Research and the American
Law Institute's Approximation Rule, 40 FAM. CT. REv. 350, 351 (2002) (relating social
science research to the approximation rule).
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of bonding and attachment security.2 " At the same time, the
approximation rule continues the shared custody arrangements that
existed before separation. Moreover, some studies have suggested
that even when parties entered joint physical custody arrangements,
the parties drifted into the custody patterns that had pre-existed the
separation, often mother custody. 0 5 In this light, the approximation
rule simply reflects the likely long-term outcomes.
While the debate about whether the law should promote joint
physical custody continues to rage,20 6 this study supports other studies
suggesting that mandatory mediation does not increase its use. In
Forsyth County, North Carolina, as in the rest of the country, joint
physical custody has not become the dominant custody arrangement.
To the contrary, of the custody resolution events concluding with
primary physical custody either to mother, father, or jointly, the
mother received primary physical custody in 71.9% of the cases.
Joint physical custody appeared in only 15.3% of the cases.20 7
Notably, plaintiffs in our study did not ask for joint physical custody,
and the study also suggested that plaintiffs usually received the
custody that they requested. While joint physical custody resulted
more often than plaintiffs requested it, particularly if the father
sought primary physical custody,20 8 still, the outcome generally
followed the plaintiffs' requests. We should not take from these
findings that mediators and courts favor plaintiffs, but rather that the
people for whom custody is most significant self-select to be
plaintiffs.2 9
Neither should we assume from our findings that courts favor
fathers. In our study, when fathers received primary physical custody,
204. Nancy S. Weinfield, Comments on Lamb's "Placing Children's Interests First," 10
VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 120, 127-28 (2002); see also Cheri L. Wood, Childless Mothers?-
The New Catch-22: You Can't Have Your Kids and Work for Them Too, 29 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 383, 386 (1995) (arguing for custody based on previously established patterns of
care).
205. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 43, at 197; see also Wood, supra note 204,
at 420.
206. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 81, and the critical review of her work in Milton C.
Regan, Jr., Divorce Reform and the Legacy of Gender, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1453 (1992). See
generally Margaret F. Brinig, Does Parental Autonomy Require Equal Custody at
Divorce?, 65 LA. L. REV. 1345 (2005) (offering empirical evidence that statutes with strong
presumptions for joint physical custody do not further the best interests of the child), and
the critical review challenging her methodology in William S. Comanor, Child Visitation
and Performance: The Evidence, 66 LA. L. REV. 763 (2006).
207. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
208. Cf Tables 3 and 4.
209. See Brinig & Allen, supra note 189, at 158 (suggesting that as women have higher
income, custody may eventually be the main reason that they file for divorce).
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they did so more often in the litigated cases (23/41, 56.1%) than they
did by mediation (5/41, 12.2%) or by other agreement (13/41,
31.7%).210 These numbers probably reflect what researchers in other
studies have concluded: lawyers counsel fathers with weak facts for
primary custody not to pursue it. The litigated cases probably reflect
those in which lawyers have advised their father clients that the facts
warrant pursuing the case, most notably, when the facts do not
involve a mother who has been the primary caregiver.1
Moreover, custody disputes cften ended with mothers having
primary custody-in 71.9% of the cases. 2  While this percentage
reflects a decline from the percentages in prior decades, 1 3 it remains
high. But as other studies have also concluded, the caregiving before
separation has a significant impact on the arrangement post-
separation. Indeed, as reflected in Table 8, the fact that the mother
had been the primary caregiver shifted resolutions away from
litigation and towards some kind of agreement-either by mediation
or by other settlement. These findings lend indirect support to the
approximation rule. A presumption in favor of the approximation
rule might encourage still more cases to settle in ways that might also
reflect the likely long-term outcomes.
B. Influences on Mandatory Mediation
While this study did not support the concerns that animated the
mediation critics, we hardly recognize court-ordered custody
mediation from the model that existed when California began its
210. See supra Table 5.
211. Lawyers may also give this advice, for example, when mothers have physical or
mental health issues, drug problems, boyfriends, or plans to move. Feminist scholars
caution that a high proportion of the litigated cases involve batterers seeking to exert
control by pursuing custody. See Meier, supra note 198, at 682-86 (citing studies that
domestic violence characterizes up to 75% of couples litigating custody and visitation).
For earlier works by mental health professionals on custody and domestic violence, see
LUNDY BANCROFT & JAY G. SILVERMAN, THE BATTERER AS PARENT: ADDRESSING
THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON FAMILY DYNAMICS (2002); PETER G. JAFFEE,
NANCY LEMON & SAMANTHA E. POISSON, CHILD CUSTODY & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
(2002); Evan Stark, Re-presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to
Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973 (1995).
212. See supra Part V(E).
213. For the decline in mother sole-custody awards, see also Maria Cancian & Daniel
Meyer, Who Gets Custody?, 35 DEMOGRAPHY 147, 147-57 (1998); Robert F. Kelly, Laura
Redenbach & William C. Rinaman, Determinants of Sole and Joint Physical Custody
Arrangements in a National Sample of Divorces, 19 AM. J. FAM. L. 25,25 (2005); Mary Ann
Mason & Ann Quirk, Are Mothers Losing Custody? Read My Lips: Trends in Judicial
Decision-Making in Custody Disputes-1920, 1960, 1990, and 1995, 31 FAM. L. Q. 215, 227
(1997).
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experiment. In two dramatic ways, the model the critics loved to hate
disappeared: the mediator lost the power to recommend an outcome
to the court and lawyers became involved in the process. Together,
the changes worked a metamorphosis.
The model of the mediator as recommender simply vanished so
that by the time Beck and Sales wrote their book on family mediation
in 2001, the authors did not include that model of mediation among
the many models that they described. 14 Instead, North Carolina's
model has become typical, providing for confidentiality of the
proceedings except under certain circumstances2 15 and disqualifying
the mediator from disclosing anything about the mediation to the
court.216 Furthermore, almost no penalties attach to a failure to
appear for mediation. The Local Rules for Forsyth County
acknowledge indirectly a penalty for failing to appear,2 17 but in
practice, the court rarely holds a party in contempt, referring the
party back to mediation or imposing no consequences. This model
clearly puts little pressure on the parties to reach a parenting
agreement.21 8
Equally as dramatic, from mediation that forbids the
participation of lawyers, Beck and Sales report that most mediation
models now assume that parties have legal advice.219 At one point in
the development of custody mediation, sociologists and psychologists
assumed that lawyers interfered with the resolution of custody
matters.220 The commentary showed little or no understanding of the
lawyer's role as counselor and negotiator even when procedurally the
lawsuit named one parent as an "adversary" against the other.
As Beck and Sales pointed out in 2000, the psychologists and
sociologists who named lawyers as the culprits in the custody process
had no evidence to support their conclusions.221 In fact, both before
and after the observations by Beck and Sales, other studies have
found that lawyers positively affect custody mediation. The
214. BECK & SALES, supra note 24.
215. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1(e) (2005); see also supra text accompanying note 79.
216. LOCAL RULES, supra note 17, at pt. V(F) ("The mediator shall not at any time
disclose to any Judge or Court Personnel the reason that the mediation was not successful.
The Court will not inquire of the parties or the mediator as to the reasons for the success
or failure of the mediation.").
217. Id. at pt. 11(2) ("In motions for contempt, the presiding judge may determine
whether to hear the motion or to refer the matter for expedited mediation.").
218. The lack of pressure partially explains the relatively low incidence of parenting
agreements: only 25.7% in our study. See supra Table 5.
219. See Beck & Sales, supra note 19, at 992.
220. See, e.g., ELLIS & STUCKLESS, supra note 141, at vii.
221. Beck & Sales, supra note 19, at 1013-16.
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culmination of a number of studies on how lawyers operate in family
law appeared in Divorce Lawyers at Work: Varieties of
Professionalism in Practice.222 The authors studied lawyers practicing
divorce law in New Hampshire and Maine and found not "bombers"
but client-centered counselors who tried to help their clients
appreciate their own and their children's long-term interests. In both
states, the lawyers worked with their clients to help them understand
what was reasonable.223 Lawyers in divorce practices accommodated
each others' schedules even more so than lawyers in other types of
practices. As a group, they were sympathetic, serving clients at
reduced fees when the clients could not pay. 4 When we compare the
lawyers described in Varieties of Professionalism to the lawyers who
inspired the non-lawyer mediation advocates, we hardly recognize
them as members of the same profession.
Our study supports the more sympathetic view of lawyers as well.
Even after parties have filed a lawsuit, most of their cases end in an
agreement, either by mediation or other settlement (59.7%).225
Moreover, the more lawyers, the more likelihood that the case will
settle. When one lawyer was involved, the parties reached an
agreement in 52.8% of the cases. When two lawyers were involved,
the parties reached an agreement, either mediation or settlement, in
63.3% of the cases (Table 7).
We know that in general, lawyers in other kinds of court-ordered
mediation programs have helped to settle cases.22 6 This study and
others suggest that by the same token, lawyers' participation in
custody helps resolve disputes.
C. Implications for the Future of Mandatory Mediation
Not many states have decided to mandate mediation in custody
disputes. At the time the American Law Institute published its
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and
2271 leeRecommendations, only eleven states ordered parents who filed a
custody claim to mediation as a condition of pursuing it.
222. LYNN MATHER, CRAIG A. MCEWEN & RICHARD J. MAIMAN, DIVORCE
LAWYERS AT WORK: VARIETIES OF PROFESSIONALISM IN PRACTICE (2001).
223. Id. at 58-59.
224. Id. at 135.
225. See supra Part V(F).
226. Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We
Know from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 641,685-86 (2002).
227. LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 50.
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Furthermore, the American Law Institute itself did not endorse the
concept.228
On whether more states should adopt mandatory mediation, we
cannot draw anything conclusive from this study. As for the concerns
reflected in the feminist critique, our study suggests that we have no
reason to fear that mediators foist a joint physical custody agenda on
compliant mothers in mandatory mediation-at least not with this
model of mediation and not with parties who are represented. Most
of the mothers in our study received the primary physical custody that
they requested, and they received it more often in mediation than
they did in other settlements or litigation.229 In fact, work in other
studies has challenged whether the feminists correctly concluded that
women suffer any disadvantage in mediation.23 °
If the study does not support the fears of mandatory mediation,
does it support the conclusion that more states ought to adopt it?
The results do not answer this question. If we measured mandatory
mediation by the numbers of parenting agreements, we would have to
say "no." In our study, parenting agreements resulted only in 23.6%
of the cases.231 But as other commentators have concluded, the
attempt at mediation appears to increase the likelihood that the
parties will resolve the dispute by agreement, if not by parenting
agreement.232  Our study suggested the same. With no attempt at
mediation, first custody resolution events occurred by court order in
50% of the cases. After an attempt at mediation, significantly fewer
first custody resolution events required the court to issue an order-
only in 38.2% of the cases.233
We do need to analyze, however, the routine use of joint legal
custody. As our study reveals, joint legal custody has become
228. Id. § 1, at 8.
229. See supra Table 5.
230. See Margaret F. Brinig, Does Mediation Systematically Disadvantage Women?, 2
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 6 (1995) (concluding that "[tihere is nothing inherent in
being a woman that precludes a successful mediation of marital problems"). The experts,
however, acknowledge that clients ought to have a certain level of competence in order to
mediate. See Connie A. Beck, Defining a Threshold for Client Competence to Participate
in Divorce Mediation, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1, 23-29 (2006).
231. See supra Part V(F) and text accompanying notes 190-91.
232. MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 43, at 272; see also Melanie R. Trost, Sanford
L. Braver & Russell Schoeneman, Mandatory Mediation: Encouraging Results for the
Court System, 26(2) CONCILIATIONS CT. REV. 26, 59-65 (1988) (offering data suggesting
that mandatory mediation rules decreased the number of custody and visitation issues
decided by judges).
233. See supra Table 10.
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standard issue in parenting agreements.234 In this finding, our study is
not unusual. Across the country, researchers report that joint legal
custody has become the norm. We need to study the effects of joint
legal custody more closely, recognizing that in high conflict families, it
may not be appropriate.236
If states keep or adopt mandatory custody mediation, the process
should protect the participants' freedom to walk away from it.237
Moreover, we should continue to study the process, making changes
that respond to the unique dynamics of custody disputes, 23 8 perhaps
encouraging mediation that involves multiple issues. 3 9 We must
remain vigilant about the qualifications of mediators 240 and think
more critically about other issues-like culture and race-in
mediation.24' While there are a few cautiously dissenting voices, 42
experience continues to argue against mediation in families where
there has been domestic violence.243
234. See supra Table 11.
235. MACCOBY AND MNOOKIN, supra note 43, at 273-74; Kathryn E. Maxwell,
Preventive Lawyering Strategies to Mitigate the Detrimental Effects of Clients' Divorces on
Their Children, 67 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 137, 145-46 (1998).
236. Maxwell, supra note 235, at 146; see also Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers
Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody Determinations, 14 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 175, 183 (noting ill effects of joint legal custody on custodian with primary
responsibility) (1992); Ver Steegh, supra note 37, at 1422 (urging that joint legal custody is
dangerous in the intimate terrorism type of domestic violence).
237. See Timothy Hedeen, Coercion and Self-Determination in Court-Connected
Mediation: All Mediations Are Voluntary, But Some Are More Voluntary than Others, 26
JUST. SYS. J. 273, 273-75 (2005) (referring to court-annexed mediation in general and
arguing that the process should not coerce the participants). For the argument in the child
custody setting, see generally Kit Furey, Mediators Cannot Be Both Mediators and
Evaluators, 38 THE ADVOC. 11 (Idaho State Bar, Dec. 1995).
238. Randy Frances Kandel, Power Plays: A Sociolinguistic Study of Inequality in
Child Custody Mediation and a Hearsay Analog Solution, 36 ARIz. L. REV. 879, 881-82
(1994).
239. See supra Table 9.
240. See generally Joan B. Kelly, Issues Facing the Family Mediation Field, 1 PEPP.
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 37 (2000) (discussing the requisite skills and training the effective
mediators).
241. Cynthia R. Mabry, African Americans "Are Not Carbon Copies" of White
Americans-The Role of African American Culture in Mediation of Family Disputes, 13
OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 405,413-57 (1998).
242. See, e.g., Nancy Ver Steegh, Yes, No, and Maybe: Informed Decision Making
About Divorce Mediation in the Presence of Domestic Violence, 9 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 145 (2003); see also Ver Steegh, supra note 37, at 1408 (distinguishing
between intimate terrorism and domestic violence, where mediation is inappropriate, and
situational couple violence, where it might be constructive).
243. ABA Committee on Family and Divorce Mediation, Andrew Schepard, Model
Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation: The Symposium on Standards of
Practice, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 121,132-33 (2001).
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If mediation is to live up to its promise, however, it must address
issues beyond the immediate conflict surrounding family dissolution.
We have learned that the conflict at the time of separation, while
painful, is not as important as the long-term post-separation
relationship of the parents. We do not know, however, if mediation
has any influence on the post-separation functioning of the family.2"
Since court-ordered mediation tends to involve only a few sessions, at
most, it may not be up to the challenge.245
CONCLUSION
Just like Marty McFly,246 what we have learned about resolving
custody disputes is that we have to be active in creating our future.
We know that mandatory mediation has not achieved all that its
proponents claimed it would, nor caused the harm that its critics
predicted. Instead, we seem to be developing a consensus around
family courts and a differentiated case management to handling
family dissolution.247
This study suggests, however, that as we head towards family
courts, we should try to make sure that parties have counsel. The
future of custody should have a place for law and lawyers, perhaps
playing more collaborative roles than we have in the past,248 but
continuing to bring the substantive law to bear on the resolving of the
disputes. What other personnel should be involved, however,
244. Beck & Sales, supra note 19, at 1027-28; MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 43,
at 290. See generally Ernest A. Sanchez & Sherrie Kibler-Sanchez, Empowering Children
in Mediation: An Intervention Model, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 554 (2004) (suggesting that
children participate in the mediation process). For a finding that mediation positively
influences post-separation functioning, see Emery et al., supra note 127.
245. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale
of Innovation Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991)
(warning that mandatory dispute resolution may result in mediation losing some of its
transformative power as the system shapes it to fit the needs of the system).
246. BACK TO THE FUTURE (Universal Studios 1985).
247. See ANDREW I. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY:
INTERDISCIPLINARY MODELS FOR DIVORCING FAMILIES 113-24 (2004); see also Ver
Steegh, supra note 37, at 1399-1414 (arguing for treatment differentiated by the types of
domestic violence involved).
248. See, e.g., Linda D. Elrod, Reforming the System to Protect Children in High
Conflict Custody Cases, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 495,499 (2001); Association of Family
and Conciliation Courts California Chapter Conference, Symposium, Collaborative Family
Law-The Big Picture, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 401, 402-17 (2004). On the other hand,
others take issue with the phrase "high-conflict divorce," contending that the phrase turns
cases involving the father's violence toward the mother into cases involving mutual
parental problems. Meier, supra note 198, at 692-700. Meier proposes the participation of
enlightened child protection agencies in private custody litigation. Id. at 717-21.
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remains in doubt. In North Carolina, we have recently introduced the
parenting coordinator, a court official who helps the parties resolve
conflicts and may decide certain issues pending court review. 49 Other
jurisdictions are experimenting with still other processes2 50 and other
actors.251
Just where are we to get the money for this approach? 22 While
we suggest that we create family courts, keep lawyers, and add other
actors, we know that costs force families increasingly to represent
themselves in custody disputes. We also need to study the impact of
pro se representation and respond to it. All we really know is our
goal: when families dissolve, we want to help children adjust. To
achieve that goal, we need to know more about children's living
arrangements after family dissolution and be ready to respond to
what the research reveals. 53
249. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-90 to -100 (Supp. 2006). The court may appoint a
coordinator if the parties consent. Without consent, the court may appoint a coordinator
upon entry of a court order or upon entry of a parenting plan and specific findings that the
case involves high conflict. § 50-91(b).
250. See SCHEPARD, supra note 247, at 122 for a discussion of differentiated case
management. See also Janet R. Johnston, Building Multidisciplinary Professional
Partnerships with the Court on Behalf of High-Conflict Divorcing Families and Their
Children: Who Needs What Kind of Help?, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 453, 456
(2000) (discussing the use of more collaborative approaches).
251. See the discussion of the special master in Janet Griffiths Peterson, The
Appointment of Special Masters in High Conflict Divorces, 15 UTAH BAR J. 16, 16-21 (Sep.
2002).
252. As Nancy Ver Steegh urges, we need to analyze very carefully the families and
their conflict to determine the proper handling of their cases. See Ver Steegh, supra note
37, at 1402-06.
253. Joan B. Kelly, Children's Living Arrangements Following Separation and Divorce:
Insights from Empirical and Clinical Research, 46 FAM. PROCESS 35, 47 (2006) (urging
professionals to be more creative in devising post-divorce living arrangements).
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